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I. INTRODUCTION
On Sunday, December 26, 1802, President Thomas Jefferson had a
choice. He could either attend afternoon worship services at the Treasury
Building, just to the east of the White House,' or he could brave the rain and
attend morning services at the United States Capitol.2 The President chose
to go the Capitol as had been his practice for the last year. He rode
horseback through the rain the 1.2 miles up muddy Pennsylvania Avenue to
the Capitol, where he listened to a sermon in the House chamber.4 The
religious services in the Capitol had begun in 1795, during George
Washington's presidency, and they continued weekly until the 1850s. 5 No
one objected or challenged the practice as unconstitutional.
Almost two hundred years later, in August 2002, a federal district court
issued a preliminary injunction allowing pastors Robert Hall and Jack
Roberts to hold Sunday services in a Bronx, New York, middle school for
their small church group called Bronx Household of Faith.6 The school
district had denied the church group access since 1995 under a policy that
allowed school buildings to be used for "social, civic, and recreational
meetings" but excluded "religious services" and later "religious worship
services."7 The Board of Education defended its policy as necessary to
1. The Treasury Building has since been burned and rebuilt, but it remains at about the same
location. See United States Department of the Treasury, About History of the Treasury, http://www.
treasury.gov/about/history/Pages/edu historybrochure.aspx#h3 (last visited Jan. 21, 2011).
2. Diary of Manasseh Cutler (Dec. 26, 1802) and Letter from Manasseh Cutler to Joseph Torrey
(Jan. 3, 1803), in 2 LIFE JOURNALS AND CORRESPONDENCE OF REV. MANASSEH CUTLER, LL.D., at
114, 119 (William Parker Cutler & Julia Perkins Cutler eds., Cincinnati, Robert Clarke & Co. 1888).
Massachusetts Representative Manasseh Cutler attended both services and observed the President in
the Capitol where "his ardent zeal brought him through the rain and on horseback to the Hall."
Letter from Manasseh Cutler to Joseph Torrey, supra.
3. Letters from Manasseh Cutler to Joseph Torrey (Jan. 4, 1802 and Jan. 3, 1803), in 2 LIFE
JOURNALS AND CORRESPONDENCE OF REV. MANASSEH CUTLER, LL.D., supra note 2, at 66, 119.
4. Diary of Manasseh Cutler (Dec. 26, 1802), in 2 LIFE JOURNALS AND CORRESPONDENCE OF
REV. MANASSEH CUTLER, LL.D., supra note 2, at 114, 119; see also In Pennsylvania Avenue: A
Stroll Through Washington's Chief Street, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 1893, at 15 ("For years Pennsylvania
Avenue was a wide and deep mud hole.").
5. 1 WILHELMUs BOGART BRYAN, A HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL CAPITAL FROM ITS
FOUNDATION THROUGH THE PERIOD OF THE ADOPTION OF THE ORGANIC ACT 260 (1914) (citing
Impartial Observer and Washington Advertiser, June 17, 1795); JAMES H. HUTSON, RELIGION AND
THE FOUNDING OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 84 (1998).
6. Bronx Household of Faith v. Bd. of Educ., 226 F. Supp. 2d 401, 427 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
7. Bronx Household of Faith v. Bd. of Educ., 400 F. Supp. 2d 581, 588, 598 (S.D.N.Y 2005).
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avoid an establishment of religion prohibited by the First Amendment.8 One
group supporting the board's policy submitted an amicus brief quoting
Thomas Jefferson's famous reference to a "wall of separation between
church and State."9 Ultimately, the district court decided in favor of Bronx
Household on the merits, but the case has yet to be resolved on appeal.'o In
its most recent hearing of the case, the Second Circuit failed to produce a
majority opinion, but Judge Calabresi argued in a lengthy concurrence that
excluding the church group was permissible."
Bronx Household is only one of the recent cases struggling with whether
government officials may exclude religious worship from limited public
forums.' 2 In Faith Center Church Evangelistic Ministries v. Glover, the
Ninth Circuit found that "religious services" could be forbidden in a library
meeting room because religious worship was a distinct category of speech."
In Badger Catholic, Inc. v. Walsh, by contrast, the Seventh Circuit held that
a student group could not be denied access to a limited public forum simply
because the group engaged in "worship, proselytizing, or religious
instruction."l4 These decisions lie at the intersection between the Free
Speech and Establishment clauses and have significant implications for
both. "
8. Bronx Household of Faith v. Bd. of Educ., 492 F.3d 89, 95 (2d Cir. 2007) (Calabresi, J.,
concurring).
9. Brief for Ass'n of the Bar of N.Y. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Defendants-Appellants at
13, Bronx Household, 492 F.3d 89 (No. 06-0725-cv) (quoting Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1,
16 (1947)), 2006 WL 4968857, at *13.
10. Bronx Household, 492 F.3d at 91 (remanding to the district court based on ripeness). The
Second Circuit heard oral arguments on the merits on October 6, 2009, but it had not issued a
decision at the time of this writing.
11. Id at 106 (Calabresi, J., concurring).
12. Older Supreme Court cases use the Latin plural of "forum," which is "fora." See, e.g., Perry
Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 55 (1983); Cornelius v. NAACP Legal
Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 800 (1985). More recently, however, the Court has
employed the modernized plural, "forums," and this Comment will do so as well. See, e.g., Santa Fe
Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 303 (2000); Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct.
1125, 1130 (2009).
13. Faith Ctr. Church Evangelistic Ministries v. Glover, 480 F.3d 891, 903, 915 (9th Cir. 2007).
14. Badger Catholic, Inc. v. Walsh, 620 F.3d 775, 777, 782 (7th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S.
Ct. 1604 (2011). The forum in Badger Catholic was not a building, but a university's program for
funding student groups. Id.
15. A number of authors have written about Bronx Household and Glover, but they have focused
mostly on free speech considerations rather than the Establishment Clause. See Norman T. Deutsch,
May Religious Worship Be Excluded from a Limited Public Forum? Commentary on the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals Decision in Faith Center Church Evangelistic Ministries v. Glover, 31 U.
HAw. L. REV. 29 (2008); Richard Esenberg, Of Speeches and Sermons: Worship in Limited Purpose
Public Forums, 78 Miss. L.J. 453 (2009); Joshua B. Marker, Note, The Worship Test: Balancing the
Religion Clauses in the Limited Public Forum, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 673 (2009); Nelson Tebbe,
Excluding Religion, 156 U. PA. L. REv. 1263 (2008); John Tyler, Comment, Is Worship a Unique
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The circuit courts in Bronx Household and Glover have focused on free
speech jurisprudence and have made almost no reference to the
Establishment Clause. 16 But these cases have been litigated in the shadow
of the Establishment Clause, which can be invoked both to support and to
oppose the exclusion of worship." In June 2009, the district court on
remand in Glover addressed the Establishment Clause issue and reached the
opposite disposition than the Ninth Circuit reached above.' 8 The district
court concluded that to exclude worship from a limited public forum fosters
an excessive government entanglement with religion in violation of the
Establishment Clause.' 9  The Seventh Circuit also addressed the
Establishment Clause and concluded that it presented no impediment to
giving equal access to religious worship.20 Although there is Supreme Court
precedent on point, lower courts have struggled with (or attempted to ignore)
three important questions. First, what is "worship"? Second, does the
Establishment Clause justify excluding worship from a limited public
forum? Third, does an attempt to define worship and exclude it from a
limited forum violate the Establishment Clause?
If these questions remain unanswered, courts such as the Ninth Circuit
will allow officials to exclude religious groups from public forums that are
otherwise open to a wide range of activities. This will not only prevent
church groups from using what are often the most available venues for their
activities, but it will also require local government actors to make
impermissible determinations about religious doctrines and practices. The
Glover decision and Judge Calabresi's concurrence in Bronx Household
have muddied the waters of First Amendment jurisprudence and directly
conflict with the Supreme Court's precedent requiring equal access for
religious groups. With the Seventh Circuit's Badger Catholic decision in
September 2010, the issue has ripened into a circuit split, a split that will
likely require resolution by the Supreme Court.2 1
Subject or a Way of Approaching Many Different Subjects? Two Recent Decisions that Attempt to
Answer This Question Set the Second and Ninth Circuits on a Course Toward State Entanglement
with Religion, 59 MERCER L. REv. 1319 (2008).
16. See Bronx Household, 492 F.3d at 105 n.8 (Calabresi, J., concurring); Glover, 480 F.3d at
919 n.20.
17. See Bronx Household, 492 F.3d at 95 (Calabresi, J., concurring) (noting that the school board
argued that if viewpoint discrimination took place, it was justified to avoid an Establishment Clause
violation); Faith Ctr. Church Evangelistic Ministries v. Glover, No. 04-03111, 2009 WL 1765974, at
*9-10 (N.D. Cal. June 19, 2009) (holding that to exclude worship would constitute an excessive
entanglement with religion). Compare Tebbe, supra note 15, at 1267-68 with Deutsch, supra note
15, at 55.
18. Glover,2009WL 1765974, at *9-10.
19. Id.
20. Badger Catholic, Inc. v. Walsh, 620 F.3d 775, 777-79, 782 (7th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131
S. Ct. 1604 (2011). This directly conflicts with the Ninth Circuit's holding in Glover, even though
the Ninth Circuit did not specifically address the Establishment Clause issue. Glover, 480 F.3d at
903, 915.
21. In an earlier phase of the Bronx Household litigation, the Second Circuit noted some
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Part II of this Comment gives the background of the Supreme Court's
jurisprudence regarding religious use of public forums and the Establishment
Clause. Part III details the early history of religious worship in Washington,
D.C.'s federal buildings. Part IV examines the Bronx Household, Glover,
and Badger Catholic decisions. Part V considers how worship in public
forums should be addressed under modem Establishment Clause tests. Part
VI concludes.
II. THE INTERSECTION OF THE FREE SPEECH AND ESTABLISHMENT
CLAUSES IN SUPREME COURT JURISPRUDENCE
The question of whether worship may be excluded from public
buildings requires understanding both the Free Speech and Establishment
Clauses of the First Amendment. Because this Comment focuses on the
Establishment Clause, it will begin with an overview of the Supreme Court's
approach to that Clause. It will then discuss the Court's cases involving
religious use of limited public forums.
A. The Supreme Court's Establishment Clause Tests
The First Amendment's Establishment Clause says, "Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion. . . ." The
Establishment Clause did not play a prominent role in the Supreme Court's
jurisprudence prior to the 1940s. 23 Since that time, the Court has developed
"unresolved issues that arise from the recent Supreme Court precedent." Bronx Household of Faith
v. Bd. of Educ., 331 F.3d 342, 355 (2d Cir. 2003). The court asked:
Would we be able to identify a form of religious worship that is divorced from the
teaching of moral values? Should we continue to evaluate activities that include religious
worship on a case-by-case basis, or should worship no longer be treated as a distinct
category of speech? ...
... In all of this process, is there not a danger of excessive entanglement by the state in
religion?
Id. The court noted that "[how the Supreme Court answers these difficult questions will no doubt
have profound implications for relations between church and state." Id.
22. U.S. CONsT. amend. I.
23. In 1940, the Court determined for the first time that the First Amendment applied to the
states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940)
("The fundamental concept of liberty embodied in [the Fourteenth] Amendment embraces the
liberties guaranteed by the First Amendment."). The Court's holding in Cantwell was limited to the
Free Exercise Clause, but seven years later the Court held that the Establishment Clause applied to
the states. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 8 (1947).
In Everson, the Court upheld a New Jersey law that allowed government funding of
transportation to school, including Catholic parochial schools. Id. at 3. The Court said:
The "establishment of religion" clause of the First Amendment means at least this:
Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can pass laws
1057
a handful of tests or principles that it employs in its modem Establishment
Clause jurisprudence.
1. The Lemon Test
The oldest of these tests is the three-prong Lemon test, which requires
that "[flirst, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its
principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits
religion; finally the statute must not foster 'an excessive government
entanglement with religion."' 24 The Lemon test has been heavily criticized
by courts and commentators.2 ' The Supreme Court's current members are
divided over the test, and the Court frequently declines to apply Lemon in
Establishment Clause cases.
The first prong of Lemon focuses on whether the government "acts with
the ostensible and predominant purpose of advancing religion." 2 7
Ordinarily, courts give deference to the stated purpose of a government
which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another. Neither can
force nor influence a person to go to or to remain away from church against his will or
force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. No person can be punished for
entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attendance or non-
attendance. No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any religious
activities or institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever form they may adopt
to teach or practice religion. Neither a state nor the Federal Government can, openly or
secretly, participate in the affairs of any religious organizations or groups and vice versa.
In the words of Jefferson, the clause against establishment of religion by law was
intended to erect "a wall of separation between Church and State."
Id. at 15-16. After Everson, the Court began periodically to strike down state laws as contrary to the
Establishment Clause. See, e.g., McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948) (finding religious
instruction in public schools unconstitutional); Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (finding
prayer in public school to be a violation of the Establishment Clause); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S.
602 (1971) (striking down direct state aid to nonpublic schools).
24. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13 (1971) (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970)
(internal citation omitted)).
25. See Thomas C. Marks, Jr. & Michael Bertolini, Lemon is a Lemon: Toward a Rational
Interpretation of the Establishment Clause, 12 B.Y.U. J. PUB. L. I (1997). Justice Antonin Scalia
has been one of Lemon's most pointed critics, and has pointed out its lack of acceptance:
Like some ghoul in a late-night horror movie that repeatedly sits up in its grave and
shuffles abroad, after being repeatedly killed and buried, Lemon stalks our Establishment
Clause jurisprudence once again, frightening the little children and school attorneys of
Center Moriches Union Free School District. Its most recent burial, only last Term, was,
to be sure, not fully six feet under: Our decision in Lee v. Weisman . . . conspicuously
avoided using the supposed "test" but also declined the invitation to repudiate it. Over
the years, however, no fewer than five of the currently sitting Justices have, in their own
opinions, personally driven pencils through the creature's heart (the author of today's
opinion repeatedly), and a sixth has joined an opinion doing so.
Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 398 (1993) (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
26. See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 319-20 (2000) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) (citing cases that chose not to apply Lemon or said it was not binding); Van Orden v.
Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 686 (2005) (plurality opinion) (declining explicitly to apply the Lemon test).
27. McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 860 (2005).
1058
[Vol. 38: 1053, 2011] Worshiping Separation
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
action, but the Supreme Court applies a more careful scrutiny if it appears
that the government is offering a sham purpose to cover a religious motive.28
The purpose prong has a number of problems. First, determining whether
the purpose of any legislative body is "secular" or "religious" is inevitably
difficult, if not impossible. 2 9 Even if it were not, the test does not account
for situations where state officials advocate a neutral policy for religious
reasons. More importantly, the purpose prong can easily be used to
invalidate laws aimed at promoting religious freedom.o30 The First
Amendment was not designed to protect citizens from religion, but to protect
religion from government interference.3 ' Some laws aimed at protecting the
free exercise of religion require a purpose that is not primarily "secular." 3 2
The second prong of Lemon does not invalidate state action only
marginally advancing or inhibiting religion, but focuses on the primary
effect of the action. * In recent years, the excessive entanglement prong has
28. See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 530 U.S. at 308 (2000) (quoting Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S.
38 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring)) ("When a governmental entity professes a secular purpose for
an arguably religious policy, the government's characterization is, of course, entitled to some
deference. But it is nonetheless the duty of the courts to 'distinguis[h] a sham secular purpose from
a sincere one."'). This tension between a policy's stated and actual purpose points to one of the
problems with Lemon's first prong. If, on the one hand, courts rely simply on the stated purpose of a
government action, the state can avoid a constitutional violation by not stating its religious purpose.
See Wallace, 472 U.S. at 108 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). This would make the purpose prong
meaningless. If, on the other hand, courts try to eradicate even hidden motives to advance religion,
they would have to strike down many laws that incidentally or directly benefit religion. Id at 108-
09.
29. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 558 (1993) (Scalia,
J., concurring) ("[1]t is virtually impossible to determine the singular 'motive' of a collective
legislative body, and this Court has a long tradition of refraining from such inquiries." (citation
omitted)).
30. See Wallace, 472 U.S. at 83 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("It is disingenuous to look for a
purely secular purpose when the manifest objective of a statute is to facilitate the free exercise of
religion by lifting a government-imposed burden."); Michael Stokes Paulsen, Lemon is Dead, 43
CASE W. RES. L. REv. 795, 801 (1993) ("Much of the Lemon framework seemed to assume that the
Establishment Clause imposes a constitutional disability on religion-that it is an 'anti-religion'
counterweight to the 'pro-religion' Free Exercise Clause rather than a protection of religious liberty.
The 'secular purpose' prong was sometimes read to reflect this erroneous assumption. It
misleadingly implied (and many courts thus held) that laws motivated by a desire to promote
religious freedom or to accommodate religious practice automatically constitute an establishment of
religion." (footnote omitted)).
31. As the Supreme Court said in Everson, "The structure of our government has, for the
preservation of civil liberty, rescued the temporal institutions from religious interference. On the
other hand, it has secured religious liberty from the invasions of the civil authority." Everson v. Bd.
of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947) (quoting Harmon v. Dreher, 17 S.C. Eq. (Speers Eq.) 87, 120 (S.C.
Ct. App. 1843)).
32. See Michael W. McConnell, Religious Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 115,
129 (1992) [hereinafter McConnell, Religious Freedom].
33. See Hernandez v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 490 U.S. 680, 696 (1989) (quoting
1059
been at least partially combined with the effects prong because both inquire
into the institution benefited, the aid provided, and the resulting relationship
between the government and religion.34 Professor Michael McConnell
points out that the effects prong can promote discrimination against
religion.3s First, government action frequently benefits a broad range of
activities and institutions, both religious and non-religious, but Lemon
prohibits such action that primarily advances religious groups. 6 Second,
like the purpose prong, the effects prong does not distinguish between
promoting religion and promoting religious freedom.
The excessive entanglement prong has some value in principle, in that it
is aimed at preventing government intrusion into religion. Again,
however, the excessive entanglement prong can be employed to be at odds
with religious freedom. Some government actions ensuring free exercise of
religion or equality for religious groups require what could be considered
government entanglement with religion.39
Despite deserved criticism, the Lemon test remains the most prominent
Establishment Clause test. A majority of the Supreme Court has employed
Lemon's purpose prong as recently as 2005.40 Thus, it is an important
starting point for any analysis of the Establishment Clause.
2. The Endorsement or Reasonable Observer Test
The second test is the endorsement test, which stems from Justice
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 442 (1961) ("[A] statute primarily having a secular effect
does not violate the Establishment Clause merely because it 'happens to coincide or harmonize with
the tenets of some or all religions."')).
34. Agonisti v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 232 (1997) ("Thus, it is simplest to recognize why
entanglement is significant and treat it . . . as an aspect of the inquiry into a statute's effect."). See
also Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 807-08 (2000) (plurality opinion) (recognizing that Agonisti
modified the Lemon test at least with respect to school aid).
35. McConnell, Religious Freedom, supra note 32, at 129.
36. Id. For example, opening a public school or library for community use, as in Bronx
Household and Glover, benefits a range of groups and viewpoints.
37. Id. McConnell points out that advancing religious liberty necessarily advances religion, but
that the opposite is not always true. Id. Advancing a particular religion can conflict with religious
liberty. Id. "By failing to distinguish between these two forms of 'advancement,' the effects prong
of the Lemon test interferes with benign government actions to accommodate or facilitate free
religious exercise." Id.
38. See McConnell, Religious Freedom, supra note 32, at 129.
39. Paulsen, supra note 30, at 809. Professor McConnell points out that "the practice of religion
is frequently intertwined with public life, and consequently that government and religion must
interact if religion is even to survive-let alone participate in civil society on a full and equal basis."
McConnell, Religious Freedom, supra note 32, at 130. Particularly because of the amorphous nature
of the term "entanglement," judges are empowered to invalidate any government action they
consider too closely connected with religion.
40. McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 861-64 (2005) (applying Lemon's purpose
prong).
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O'Connor's concurrence in Lynch v. Donelly in 1984.41 This "test" is not
always used independently but is sometimes used merely to analyze
Lemon's first and second prongs. 42 The endorsement inquiry focuses on
whether a reasonable observer would perceive a government endorsement of
religion. 43  A majority of the Court applied the test for the first time in
County ofAllegheny v. ACLU Greater Pittsburg Chapter."
Under Justice O'Connor's formulation of the test, the reasonable
observer is not based on any individual or group. 45 Rather, "the reasonable
observer in the endorsement inquiry must be deemed aware of the history
and context of the community and forum in which the religious display
appears."46 In Pinette, Justice O'Connor concurred in the Court's judgment
that the Ku Klux Klan could display a cross in a public space that was open
to all forms of expressive conduct.47  She concluded that a reasonable
observer, aware that the area surrounding the capitol was open to both
secular and religious groups, would not perceive an endorsement of
religion.48 Justice John Paul Stevens, in his dissent, criticized Justice
O'Connor's "ideal human" as a "legal fiction," and he expressed his
preference for an ordinary reasonable person standard. 49 The endorsement
41. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 691(1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
42. See id at 690 ("The purpose prong of the Lemon test asks whether government's actual
purpose is to endorse or disapprove of religion. The effect prong asks whether, irrespective of
government's actual purpose, the practice under review in fact conveys a message of endorsement or
disapproval.").
43. See Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU Greater Pittsburg Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 630 (1989)
(O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
44. Id. at 592 (majority opinion) ("In recent years, we have paid particularly close attention to
whether the challenged governmental practice either has the purpose or effect of 'endorsing'
religion, a concern that has long had a place in our Establishment Clause jurisprudence."). In
County ofAllegheny, a majority of a very fragmented Court held that the display of a nativity scene
on public property violated the Establishment Clause but upheld as constitutional the display of a
menorah next to a Christmas tree and a sign saluting liberty. Id at 601-02, 620.
45. Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 780 (1995) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
46. Id. Scholars have criticized this test as unrealistic because it requires the hypothetical
observer to know so much. See Kristi L. Bowman, Seeing Government Purpose Through the
Objective Observer's Eyes: The Evolution-Intelligent Design Debates, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
417, 466 (2006) ("[T]he reasonable observer evaluating government purpose will be required to have
an unreasonably vast command of issues of law, yet is confined by a more limited command of facts
than those to which a court is privy."); Susan Hanley Kosse, A Missed Opportunity to Abandon the
Reasonable Observer Framework in Sacred Text Cases: McCreary County v. ACLU of Kentucky
and Van Orden v. Perry, 4 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 139, 162-63 (2006) ("When analyzing the first
[Lemon] prong, the government's purpose, the fiction of a reasonable observer requires the
hypothetical observer to know much more than an actual observer knows.").
47. Pinette, 515 U.S. at 782 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
48. Id.
49. Id. at 800 n.5 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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test's great weakness is that it is unclear what the reasonable observer knows
and how the observer would perceive a particular government action.50 In
fact, this is always a matter of opinion." So, the endorsement test is not
really a "test" as much as it is a stand-in for a judge's own opinion.5 2
Nevertheless, the Court or its members continue to invoke the endorsement
test."
3. The Coercion Test
The third test is the coercion test, first employed by the Court in Lee v.
Weisman. 54 In Weisman, the Court held that nonsectarian prayer at a middle
school graduation violated the Establishment Clause." Writing for the
majority, Justice Anthony Kennedy said, "It is beyond dispute that, at a
minimum, the Constitution guarantees that government may not coerce
anyone to support or participate in religion or its exercise, or otherwise act in
a way which 'establishes a [state] religion or religious faith, or tends to do
so.'"56  Justice Kennedy concluded that there were "subtle coercive
pressures" upon students to stand and participate in the prayer because
students "had no real alternative ... to avoid the fact or appearance of
participation."57  But, although Justice Kennedy relied on coercion in his
opinion, Justices Harry Blackmun and David Souter were careful to clarify
50. See Kosse, supra note 46, at 163 ("[T]his method will only work if there is agreement
regarding what it is the reasonable observer must know. Absent such agreement, a judge must
decide between competing theories."); Mark Strasser, The Protection and Alienation of Religious
Minorities: On the Evolution of the Endorsement Test, 2008 MICH. ST. L. REv. 667, 724 ("Part of
the difficulty is that the Supreme Court Justices do not, themselves, have a clear understanding of
what the test is supposed to accomplish. Nor is there any consensus on the characteristics of an
objective observer.").
51. Justice Scalia, writing for the plurality in Pinette, implied that the endorsement test, if used at
all, should apply only to government expression, not to private expression. Pinette, 515 U.S. at 763-
64 (plurality opinion). He criticized Justice O'Connor's endorsement test as supplying "no standard
whatsoever," pointing to disagreement among the circuit courts, and even among members of the
Supreme Court, as to who the reasonable observer should be. Id at 768 n.3.
52. See Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion, 1985 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 48
[hereinafter McConnell, Accommodation] ("Looking to an 'objective observer' cannot substitute for
constitutional standard. Such a formulation serves merely to avoid stating what considerations
inform the judgment that a statute is constitutional or unconstitutional. If Justice O'Connor's
'objective observer' standard were adopted by the courts, we would know nothing more than that
judges will decide cases the way they think they should be decided."). This makes the test at best
redundant and at worst deceptive and confusing.
53. See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 305-07 (2000); McCreary Coty. v.
ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 862 (2005) ("The eyes that look to purpose belong to an 'objective
observer' . . . ."); Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1142 (2009) (Souter, J.,
concurring) ("The adoption of [the reasonable observer test] would thus serve coherence within
Establishment Clause law. . . .").
54. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 586 (1992).
55. Id.
56. Id. at 587 (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 678(1984)).
57. Id at 588.
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in their concurrences that coercion was only one type of violation and not
sufficient by itself as an Establishment Clause test.58
Justice Kennedy's test is difficult to justify and even more difficult to
apply. First, to contend that "subtle pressures" to stand during prayer
constitute an "establishment of religion" stretches the word "establishment"
far beyond its ordinary meaning.59 More importantly, the test presents
serious problems with the state action doctrine-the longstanding principle
that only state actors can violate the constitution.60 The First Amendment
only prohibits a law respecting an establishment of religion. Under Justice
Kennedy's version of the coercion test, the government violates the
Establishment Clause if it provides the context in which "subtle coercive
pressures" occur, even if the pressures are created by private actors.6
In his dissent in Lee v. Weisman, Justice Scalia proposed an alternative
test that would require legal coercion backed by a penalty, rather than
"psychological coercion." 62  He said, "[W]hile I have no quarrel with the
Court's general proposition that the Establishment Clause 'guarantees that
government may not coerce anyone to support or participate in religion or its
exercise,' . . . I see no warrant for expanding the concept of coercion beyond
acts backed by threat of penalty. ..*." Justice Clarence Thomas also
58. Id. at 604-06 (Blackmun, J., concurring) ("Although our precedents make clear that proof of
government coercion is not necessary to prove an Establishment Clause violation, it is sufficient.");
id. at 619 (Souter, J., concurring) ("[Precedent] simply cannot, however, support the position that a
showing of coercion is necessary to a successful Establishment Clause claim.").
59. The Oxford English Dictionary gives as one definition of establishment, "[t]he 'establishing'
by law (a church, religion, form of worship)." "Establishment," OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY
ONuNE. The word used in this sense means "[njow usually, the conferring on a particular religious
body the position of a state church." Id. See also WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL
DICTIONARY 778 (2002) (defining "establish" as "to make firm or stable ... to found or base
securely . . . to assist, support, or nurture so that stability and continuance are assured . . . to make a
national or state institution of (a church)").
60. See Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 191 (1988) (noting the
distinction between state action, subject to scrutiny under the Fourteenth Amendment, and "private
conduct, against which the Amendment affords no shield, no matter how unfair that conduct may
be").
61. See Paulsen, supra note 30, at 798-99 ("Contrary to the confused approach of the Weisman
majority, it must be made clear that the forbidden coercion is government coercion-state action, not
private action-lest the Establishment Clause be perverted into a sword of suppression of private
religious expression and evangelism that occurs on public property and lest private expression
generally be deprived of constitutional protection whenever it occurs in a forum maintained or
sanctioned by the state.").
62. Lee, 505 U.S. at 638, 642 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia might not have been
proposing a constitutional "test" of legal coercion. He could have simply been acknowledging that
legal coercion would constitute an Establishment Clause violation.
63. Id. at 642 (citation omitted).
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supports a legal coercion test." A significant benefit of the legal coercion
test is that it is relatively easy to apply, as compared with Justice Kennedy's
test.6s
A majority of the Court has never adopted the coercion principle as an
independent Establishment Clause test. A majority has, however, applied
Justice Kennedy's version in conjunction with other tests." Thus, the
coercion test forms an important element of modem Establishment Clause
jurisprudence.
4. Neutrality
Apart from these three tests, the Court has frequently referred to the
principle of government neutrality toward religion. The Court sometimes
invokes the neutrality principle in conjunction with other tests and
sometimes as an independent test of sorts.68  Whether expressed or not,
however, the neutrality principle is behind much of today's Establishment
Clause jurisprudence.
The neutrality principle arose out of Everson v. Board of Education, in
which the Court held that neither the state nor federal governments may
"pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion
over another."70  The neutrality required by the Court's modem
jurisprudence is not necessarily strict neutrality because the First
Amendment recognizes that religion requires certain government
protections.7' As Justice O'Connor has observed, "It is difficult to square
64. See Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 48, 52-54 (Thomas, J., concurring
in the judgment) ("The traditional 'establishments of religion' to which the Establishment Clause is
addressed necessarily involve actual legal coercion .... ).
65. See Ralph W. Johnson, Ill, Lee v. Weisman: Easy Cases Can Make Bad Law Too-The
"Direct Coercion" Test Is the Appropriate Establishment Clause Standard, 2 GEO. MASON INDEP.
L. REV. 123, 178 (1993). Ralph Johnson argues that the "direct coercion" standard is beneficial
because it focuses "on the actual effects of governmental power and not on mere appearances." Id.
at 178-79. Furthermore, he argues that it comports best with the Establishment Clause's original
purpose. Id. at 179.
66. See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000) (applying Lemon and the
endorsement prong as well as the coercion test).
67. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 839 (1995) ("[A]
significant factor in upholding governmental programs in the face of Establishment Clause attack is
their neutrality towards religion.").
68. See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 248 (1990) (contrasting neutrality with
endorsement); Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 764 (1995) (finding
that there is no Establishment Clause violation for neutral policies benefiting religion).
69. See Monte Kuligowski, Does the Declaration of Independence Pass the Lemon Test?, 2
DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL'Y 287, 296 (2007) ("We must therefore remember that all
subsequent tests invented and used by the Court (to define establishment) are merely subsets and
expressions of the neutrality principle.").
70. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947).
71. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 673 (1984) ("Nor does the Constitution require
complete separation of church and state; it affirmatively mandates accommodation, not merely
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any notion of 'complete neutrality,' . . . with the mandate of the Free
Exercise Clause that government must sometimes exempt a religious
observer from an otherwise generally applicable obligation. A government
that confers a benefit on an explicitly religious basis is not neutral toward
religion." 72  One difficulty in applying the neutrality principle is that it
neither requires strict neutrality nor allows obvious disfavor toward
religion.73
Although it is widely accepted as a pillar of Establishment Clause
jurisprudence, the neutrality principle rests upon a shaky historical
foundation. As observed by Justice William Rehnquist in his dissent in
Wallace v. Jaffree, none of the members of the First Congress
expressed the slightest indication that they thought the language
before them . .. or the evil to be aimed at, would require that the
Government be absolutely neutral between religion and irreligion.
The evil to be aimed at, so far as those who spoke were concerned,
appears to have been the establishment of a national church, and
perhaps the preference of one religious sect over another; but it was
definitely not concerned about whether the Government might aid
all religions evenhandedly.74
Justice Joseph Story in his Commentaries also indicated that the historical
understanding of the First Amendment did not require neutrality. He wrote
about the First Amendment:
Probably at the time of the adoption of the constitution, and of the
amendment to it, now under consideration, the general, if not the
universal, sentiment in America was, that Christianity ought to
receive encouragement from the state, so far as was not
incompatible with the private rights of conscience, and the freedom
of religious worship. An attempt to level all religions, and to make
it a matter of state policy to hold all in utter indifference, would
tolerance, of all religions, and forbids hostility toward any."); McConnell, Accommodation, supra
note 52, at 9.
72. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 82-83 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
73. Steven D. Smith, Symbols, Perceptions, and Doctrinal Illusions: Establishment Neutrality
and the 'No Endorsement' Test, 86 MICH. L. REv. 266, 314 (1987) ("This pervasive commitment to
neutrality has not yet generated any clear and convincing account of what neutrality actually entails.
It has become increasingly clear, rather, that neutrality is a 'coat of many colors."' (quoting Bd. of
Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 249 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring))).
74. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 99 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
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have created universal disapprobation, if not universal indignation.
Thus, the neutrality principle is not well-supported by constitutional
history." It nevertheless remains a lynchpin of modem Establishment
Clause jurisprudence.
5. History and Traditions
A final principle or test employed by the Court is the "history and
traditions" approach to the Establishment Clause. This approach looks at
whether a practice or policy is "deeply embedded in the history and tradition
of this country," dating back to the time of the Constitution's adoption.
This specific test has only been employed in one case, but the Court often
looks to history when interpreting the First Amendment.so
In Marsh v. Chambers, the Court found that opening legislative sessions
with prayer by paid chaplains did not violate the Establishment Clause.
Legislative prayer was "deeply embedded in the history and tradition of this
country," beginning before the adoption of the Constitution.82 The Court
observed that the First Congress authorized the appointment of paid
chaplains only three days before it adopted the final language of the First
Amendment.8' Although historical patterns do not justify contemporary
violations of constitutional provisions, "historical evidence sheds light not
only on what the draftsmen intended the Establishment Clause to mean, but
also on how they thought that Clause applied to the practice authorized by
the First Congress-their actions reveal their intent."84 Thus, the Court
found that invoking Divine guidance on a legislature is neither an
establishment of religion nor a step toward it, but simply an
75. 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1868
(Da Capo Press 1970) (1833) (footnote omitted). The Supreme Court, of course, has chosen not to
follow this original understanding in many areas of Establishment Clause jurisprudence. See
Wallace, 472 U.S. at 53 n.37.
76. This is not to say that the historical understanding of the Establishment Clause required no
neutrality. It is likely that the framers of the First Amendment believed that the government must
afford the same protections for speech motivated by irreligion as it did to speech motivated by
religion. See McConnell, Accommodation, supra note 52, at 10.
77. McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 860 (2005).
78. See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 786 (1983).
7 9. Id.
80. This practice in the Establishment Clause area dates back at least to Everson v. Board of
Education, 330 U.S. 1, 8-15 (1947). It has been employed by a majority or plurality of the Court in
cases such as Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983) and Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677
(2005), and has been particularly common fare in concurring and dissenting opinions. See Wallace,
472 U.S. 38 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); McCreary Cnty., 545 U.S. at 886-89 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
81. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 786.
82. Id
83. Id. at 788. The Court found it highly unlikely that the framers of the Establishment Clause
believed the Clause prohibited the practice they had just adopted. Id. at 790.
84. Id.
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acknowledgement of widely held beliefs.
History is particularly applicable in interpreting the Establishment
Clause of the First Amendment. As the Court said in Everson, whether a
law is one respecting an establishment of religion "requires an understanding
of the meaning of that language.. . . [T]herefore, it is not inappropriate
briefly to review the background and environment of the period in which
that constitutional language was fashioned and adopted."86  More recently,
the Court has said an unbroken practice spanning our national existence "is
not something to be lightly cast aside."8
The Court has at times tried to limit Marsh's rationale and the
applicability of history in constitutional interpretation. The Court has said
"Marsh plainly does not stand for the sweeping proposition . .. that all
accepted practices 200 years old and their equivalents are constitutional
today.""9 The Court said historical breaches of religious neutrality do not
diminish the force of the First Amendment's requirements.90 So the Court
has indicated that history is at least not conclusive. But that does not render
history irrelevant. History is certainly relevant to interpreting the words
"respecting an establishment of religion" in the First Amendment.9'
Historical evidence of period practices, such as legislative prayer, can shed
light on the intent of the First Amendment's framers. 92  Furthermore, the
85. Id. at 792.
86. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 8 (1947). Justice Black then spent five pages tracing the
history of religious freedom in America and James Madison and Thomas Jefferson's resistance to a
state-supported church in Virginia. Id. at 8-13. His historical account has been strongly criticized
by subsequent scholars. See William C. Porth & Robert P. George, Trimming the Ivy: A
Bicentennial Re-Examination of the Establishment Clause, 90 W. VA. L. REV. 109, 127-28 (1987)
(compiling authors critical of Justice Black's historiography).
87. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 678 (1970). In Walz, the Court found property tax
exemptions constitutional for properties of religious organizations "used solely for religious
worship." Id. at 666-67. The Court reasoned that tax exemption is not sponsorship, and the
exemption creates only a "minimal and remote involvement between church and state and far less
than taxation of churches." Id at 676. The fact that the properties were used solely for religious
worship was of no consequence to the Court for Establishment Clause purposes.
88. See Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU Greater Pittsburg Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 603 (1989).
89. Id County ofAllegheny did not, however, overrule Marsh, which still stands as good law.
90. Id at 604.
91. See Everson, 330 U.S. at 8. Without some reference to the historical context, one might not
know that the Establishment Clause was designed to protect the ability of states to maintain
established churches. Furthermore, the historical reality of the debate between Federalists and Anti-
federalists is an essential backdrop to understanding the entire Bill of Rights.
92. See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 790 (1983). Although a constitutional jurisprudence
could theoretically be developed without reference to the Constitution's adoption and early history,
such a course would be exceedingly unwise and out of line with the American tradition. Even if
constitutional interpretation must sometimes develop and change with the times, it ought to at least
include a real inquiry into the drafters' intent and the meaning they attached to certain provisions.
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history of religious worship in early federal buildings is highly relevant to
whether worship should be allowed in public buildings today.93
The Court's current Establishment Clause jurisprudence seems to be a
selective mixing and matching of all these tests, depending on the nature of
the case and which members of the Court gain a majority. 94 But when the
Establishment Clause intersects with free speech, as in Bronx Household,
Glover, and Badger Catholic, the Court has been more consistent and has
not allowed state actors to discriminate against religious speech by invoking
the Establishment Clause.95 In the context of public speech forums, the
Court has never held that the Establishment Clause justifies a denial of equal
access to religious speech or speakers. 96
B. Religious Speech in Limited Public Forums
The presence of religious groups and religious speech in public
buildings is not a novel issue, but one the Supreme Court has addressed
several times. The Court analyzes most restrictions on speech or expressive
activity based on the type of "speech forum" in which the speech takes
place.97  In Bronx Household, Glover, and Badger Catholic, the courts
concluded or assumed that the government property was a limited public
forum. 9 The government creates a limited public forum when it designates
This is especially true when novel questions of law are presented that are not easily answered by
established precedent.
93. Only the early history of federal buildings is relevant because the Establishment Clause was
not applied to the states until 1947. See Everson, 330 U.S. at 15-16. Worship in state buildings
would hardly be surprising in an era when some states still had established churches. See Engel v.
Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 427-28 (1962).
94. See McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 859, 867-74 (2005) (citing Lemon and
employing the "reasonable observer" test); Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 686 (2005) (plurality
opinion) (calling the Lemon test "not useful" for examining a Ten Commandments monument);
Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 307-10 (2000) (applying Lemon, endorsement, and
coercion tests). Justice Thomas's observation that the Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence
"is in hopeless disarray" is probably more true now than when he wrote it. See Rosenberger v.
Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 861 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring).
95. See discussion infra, notes 103-39 and accompanying text.
96. The one possible exception is Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712 (2004) (upholding a Washington
State exclusion of degrees in theology from a public scholarship). But Davey was decided on Free
Exercise grounds, and it involved a state constitutional prohibition on providing funds for religious
or devotional degrees. Id. at 716, 719.
97. See Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1132 (2009).
98. Bronx Household of Faith v. Bd. of Educ., 492 F.3d 89, 97-98 (2d Cir. 2007) (Calabresi, J.,
concurring); Faith Ctr. Church Evangelistic Ministries v. Glover, 480 F.3d 891, 908 (9th Cir. 2007);
Roman Catholic Found., UW-Madison, Inc. v. Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys., 578 F. Supp. 2d 1121,
1130 (W.D. Wis. 2008), affd sub nom. Badger Catholic, Inc. v. Walsh, 620 F.3d 775, 778, 782 (7th
Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1604 (2011). This classification is at the very least questionable.
Judge Walker expressed some doubt in his Bronx Household dissent as to whether this classification
was correct. Bronx Household, 492 F.3d at 128 n.7 (Walker, J., dissenting) (referring to the "limited
public forum the Board has allegedly created"). One serious problem with the classification is that a
limited public forum is generally defined by what it includes, not by what it excludes, and certain
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a place or channel of communication for public discussion of certain
subjects or for use by certain groups. 99 In such a forum, the government
may impose restrictions based on subject matter or topic as long as the
restrictions do not discriminate based on viewpoint and are reasonable in
light of the forum's purpose. 0o Viewpoint discrimination takes place when
the government regulates speech based on the motivating ideology, opinion,
or perspective of the speaker, and this form of discrimination is always
impermissible in a public forum.' 1o Viewpoint-neutral limitations on the
content or subject matter of speech are permissible to "preserve[] the
purposes of that limited forum," but the restrictions must be reasonable. 102
In Widmar v. Vincent, the Supreme Court held that a state university that
opened its facilities generally to student groups could not exclude a group
wishing to use the facilities for "religious worship and religious
exclusions are prohibited. See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 267 (1981). In Bronx Household,
state law allowed school districts to open school facilities for "social, civic and recreational meetings
and entertainments, and other uses pertaining to the welfare of the community; but such meetings,
entertainment and uses shall be nonexclusive and shall be open to the general public." Bronx
Household, 492 F.3d at 92 (Calabresi, J., concurring). But the modified policy excepted "religious
worship services, or otherwise using a school as a house of worship." Id. at 94. In Glover, the
library was open to use by non-profits for "meetings, programs, or activities of educational, cultural
or community interest," with the exception of use by schools as regular part of the curriculum and
"religious services." Glover, 480 F.3d at 902-03. In both cases, the policies used broad language
that could indicate that the government was designating a public forum, which can take place when
the government "intentionally open[s] a nontraditional forum for public discourse." Cornelius v.
NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 802 (1985). See Bronx Household of Faith v.
Cmty. Sch. Dist. No. 10, 127 F.3d 207, 218 (2d Cir. 1997) (Cabranes, I., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (noting that the Supreme Court in Lamb's Chapel had hinted that a school might
not be able to claim it had created only a limited public forum when it opened its facilities
"indiscriminately, except as to a very narrow class of excluded communicative uses"). In a
designated public forum, as opposed to a limited public forum, content-based regulations must be
justified by a compelling state interest and must be narrowly tailored to achieve that interest. Perry
Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983). So, if the forum classification
in Bronx Household and Glover were reconsidered, it could change the applicable level of scrutiny.
A full analysis, however, is beyond the scope of this Comment.
99. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802 (citing Perry Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 45, 46 n.7) ("In addition to
traditional public fora, a public forum may be created by government designation of a place or
channel of communication for use by the public at large for assembly and speech, for use by certain
speakers, or for the discussion of certain subjects."). See also Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1132 (2009)
("[A] government entity may create a forum that is limited to use by certain groups or dedicated
solely to the discussion of certain subjects.").
100. Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 106-07 (2001); Summum, 129 S. Ct. at
1132. Restrictions based on subject matter or topic are defined as "content discrimination." Perry
Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 59, 61-62.
101. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995) ("The
government must abstain from regulating speech when the specific motivating ideology or the
opinion or perspective of the speaker is the rationale for the restriction.").
102. Id. at 829-30.
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discussion."' 0 3 The student group's meetings included prayer, hymns, Bible
commentary, and discussion of religious views and experiences.' 0 The
Court said religious worship and discussion were forms of speech protected
by the First Amendment.'o The Court rejected the dissent's attempt to
distinguish between religious worship and religious speech, observing:
First, the dissent fails to establish that the distinction has
intelligible content. There is no indication when "singing hymns,
reading scripture, and teaching biblical principles," . . . cease to be
"singing, teaching, and reading"-all apparently forms of "speech,"
despite their religious subject matter-and become unprotected
"worship."
Second, even if the distinction drew an arguably principled line,
it is highly doubtful that it would lie within the judicial competence
to administer. Merely to draw the distinction would require the
university-and ultimately the courts-to inquire into the
significance of words and practices to different religious faiths, and
in varying circumstances by the same faith. Such inquiries would
tend inevitably to entangle the State with religion in a manner
forbidden by our cases. 06
The Court chose instead to apply the "applicable constitutional standards,"
which require that content-based speech regulation be justified by a
compelling governmental interest. 07
The university argued that complying with the Establishment Clause
constitutes a compelling interest. 08 The Court flatly rejected this argument,
however, saying that a policy of equal access does not offend the
Establishment Clause under the Lemon test. 09 An open-forum policy that
does not discriminate between religious and non-religious speech has a
secular purpose and avoids excessive government entanglement with
religion." 0  Furthermore, the Court determined that allowing religious
groups to share the forum would not have the primary effect of advancing
religion."' Any benefits religious groups might receive would be merely
103. Widmar, 454 U.S. at 264-65, 267.
104. Id. at 265 n.2.
105. Id at 269. Specifically, the Court said, the university "has discriminated against student
groups and speakers based on their desire to use a generally open forum to engage in religious
worship and discussion. These are forms of speech and association protected by the First
Amendment." Id.
106. Id. at 269 n.6 (citations omitted).
107. Id. at 267, 277.
108. Id. at 270-71. And the Court acknowledged that complying with the Constitution could be
characterized as a compelling interest. Id. at 271.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 271-72.
111. Id. at 272. The issue, the Court noted, was not whether the university could open a religious
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incidental to the open forum policy and thus would create no conflict with
the Establishment Clause."'
In Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School District, the
Court considered religious access to a public school using the endorsement
test."' A church group sought access to public school facilities to show a
Christian film series about child rearing, and it was denied access under the
school district's policy against use for "religious purposes."ll 4 The Court
found this exclusion to be viewpoint discrimination in violation of the First
Amendment." 5 The district argued, however, that allowing its facilities to
be used for religious purposes would constitute an establishment of
religion." 6 The Court said fears of an Establishment Clause violation were
"unfounded" because there was "no realistic danger that the community
would think that the District was endorsing religion or any particular creed,
and any benefit to religion or to the Church would have been no more than
incidental.""' The Court also briefly observed that religious use of school
property would not be an establishment of religion under the Lemon test."8
In Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the University of Virginia, the
Supreme Court determined that a Christian student publication could not be
denied funding because of its viewpoint.' The University denied funding
solely because the paper "primarily promotes or manifests a particular
belie[f] in or about a deity or an ultimate reality." 20  Although the
University's student activity fund created "a forum more in a metaphysical
than in a spatial or geographical sense," the Court determined that the same
principles applied as in an ordinary limited forum.12' The Fourth Circuit had
determined that although the University's withholding of funds had violated
the Free Speech Clause, it was justified by the state's compelling interest in
forum, but whether it could exclude groups from an already open forum based on the content of their
speech. Id. at 273.
112. Id The Court noted that an open forum policy does not "confer any imprimatur of state
approval on religious sects or practices" and that the forum was "available to a broad class of
nonreligious as well as religious speakers." Id. at 274.
113. Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 395 (1993).
114. Id.at387-88.
115. Id. at 394. This was a different conclusion than in Widmar, where the Court had found the
exclusion of religious speech to be content-based.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 395.
118. Id. ("The challenged governmental action has a secular purpose, does not have the principal
or primary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion, and does not foster excessive entanglement
with religion.").
119. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 845-46 (1995).
120. Id. at 823.
121. Id. at 830.
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avoiding an Establishment Clause violation. 122 The Supreme Court
reversed, observing, "It does not violate the Establishment Clause for a
public university to grant access to its facilities on a religion-neutral basis to
a wide spectrum of student groups, including groups that use meeting rooms
for sectarian activities, accompanied by some devotional exercises." 2 3
Similarly, paying the printing costs of a religious publication as part of a
neutral policy open to other groups did not conflict with the Establishment
Clause. 124 In fact, the Court said, requiring officials to "scan and interpret
student publications to discern their underlying assumptions respecting
religious theory and belief' would "risk fostering a bias or hostility to
religion, which could undermine the very neutrality the Establishment
Clause requires."1 25
The Supreme Court again found viewpoint discrimination in Good News
Club v. Milford Central School when a public school denied a Christian
club's request to use school facilities after hours.12 6 Milford had created a
forum for events "pertaining to the welfare of the community," but chose to
exclude the Good News Club because the school considered the club's
activities to be religious instruction.127  The Good News Club classes
included prayer, songs, Bible reading, and an invitation for children "to trust
the Lord Jesus to be your Savior from sin."l 28 The Second Circuit held that
because the club's activities were "quintessentially religious," they were not
pure "moral and character development," and therefore to exclude them was
not viewpoint discrimination.129 The Supreme Court rejected this argument
and found it "quite clear that Milford engaged in viewpoint
discrimination."o30  The Court also rejected Milford's argument that the
club's activities could be excluded because they constituted "religious
worship."' 3 ' The Court said in a footnote,
122. Id at 838.
123. Id at 842 (citing Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 252 (1990); Widmar v. Vincent,
454 U.S. 263, 269 (1981)).
124. Id. at 843-44.
125. Id. at 845-46.
126. Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 102, 109 (2001).
127. Id. at 108. The Court did not analyze whether Milford created a designated public forum or a
limited public forum because the parties had agreed that the district created a limited public forum.
Id. at 106. The Court therefore "assume[d]" for purposes of the case that it was a limited forum. Id.
The distinction had little significance anyway, since the Court found that the exclusion constituted
viewpoint discrimination, which is impermissible in either type of forum. Id.; see Cornelius v.
NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 800 (1985).
128. Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 137-38 (Souter, J., dissenting). The majority considered
Justice Souter's recitation of the club's activities to be "accurate." Id at 112 n.4 (majority opinion).
129. Id. at lI l.
130. Id at 109. The Court said, "We disagree that something that is 'quintessentially religious' or
'decidedly religious in nature' cannot also be characterized properly as the teaching of morals and
character development from a particular viewpoint." Id. at 111.
131. Idatll2n.4.
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Despite Milford's insistence that the Club's activities constitute
"religious worship," the Court of Appeals made no such
determination. It did compare the Club's activities to "religious
worship," but ultimately it concluded merely that the Club's
activities "fall outside the bounds of pure 'moral and character
development."' In any event, we conclude that the Club's activities
do not constitute mere religious worship, divorced from any
teaching of moral values. 132
The Court concluded in the same footnote that what mattered was the
substance of the club's activities, not the label attached to them.133
As in Lamb's Chapel,134 the school district contended that even if its
policy were viewpoint discrimination, its interest in avoiding an
Establishment Clause violation outweighed the club's interest in equal
access.'35 The Court concluded that the school had "no valid Establishment
Clause interest."1 36 Allowing the club to use school property would uphold
the principle of neutrality toward religion, and no one in the community
would feel coerced into participating in the club's activities.137 The Court
rejected the argument that impressionable children might perceive an
establishment of religion.13 It noted that the threat of a perceived
endorsement would likely be no greater than that of a perceived hostility
toward religion if the club were excluded from the forum.3 9
Despite its inconsistencies in other areas of Establishment Clause
jurisprudence, the Court has unequivocally required equal access to religious
132. Id. (citations omitted).
133. Id. This was in response to Justice Souter, who characterized the club's activities as "an
evangelical service of worship." Id. at 138 (Souter, J., dissenting).
134. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
135. Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 112. The same argument in the alternative was made by the
board of education in Bronx Household, though the panel did not address it any detail. See Bronx
Household of Faith v. Bd. of Educ., 492 F.3d 89, 95, 105 n.8 (2d Cir. 2007) (Calabresi, J.,
concurring).
136. Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 113. The Court did not merely say that the club's interest
outweighed the school's interest in avoiding an establishment, but that the school had no valid
interest at all. Id.
137. Id.atll4-15.
138. Id at 115-19. The Court said:
We cannot operate, as Milford would have us do, under the assumption that any risk that
small children would perceive endorsement should counsel in favor of excluding the
Club's religious activity. We decline to employ Establishment Clause jurisprudence
using a modified heckler's veto, in which a group's religious activity can be proscribed
on the basis of what the youngest members of the audience might misperceive.
Id. at 119.
139. Id. at 118.
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groups and speakers in public forums, limited or otherwise. 14 0  It has
recognized that the Establishment Clause can sometimes provide a
compelling reason for limiting access to a forum.141 But it has also indicated
that excluding religion from public forums, even limited public forums,
could conflict with the Establishment Clause. 142
III. HISTORY OF WORSHIP IN PUBLIC BUILDINGS IN THE UNITED STATES
The issue of whether worship should be kept out of public property has
only been litigated significantly within the past thirty years.143 Using public
buildings for religious purposes, however, has a long history in the United
States. As explained below,'" this history is highly relevant to an inquiry
into the practice's constitutionality.
America's early history supports the conclusion that allowing religious
worship in public buildings does not offend the Establishment Clause. In
fact, Congress and the President opened Washington's D.C.'s federal
buildings to worship for decades. By the time Congress moved into the
United States Capitol in 1800, church services had been taking place in the
building for over five years.145  Reverend George Ralph, Rector of Christ
Episcopal Church, began holding public worship in the yet uncompleted
Capitol in the middle of June 1795.146 Thomas Jefferson began regularly
attending services in the hall of the House of Representatives in January of
1802, a practice that he continued for the rest of his time in office. 147 One
Congressional chaplain, the Reverend William Parkinson, wrote that the
President "has never missed but ONE of my meetings at the capitol while in
the city."'48 Jefferson attended services in the Capitol on January 3, 1802,
140. Id at 120; Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 393-95
(1993); see Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 267-69 (1981).
141. Widmar,454 U.S. at 271.
142. GoodNews Club, 533 U.S. at 118, 272 n.11.
143. The presence on public property of voluntary worship by private parties was first addressed
specifically in Widmar, 454 U.S. at 263.
144. See infra notes 288-94.
145. FED. ORRERY (Boston), July 2, 1795, at 289. The Boston newspaper reported, "CITY OF
WASHINGTON, June 19. It is with much pleasure that we discover the rising consequence of our
infant city. Public worship is now regularly administered at the capitol, every [S]unday morning, at
11 o'clock by the [R]everend [M]r. RALPH . . . ." Id; see also CARLISLE GAZETTE, July 1, 1795, at
2; NEW HAMPSHIRE GAZETTE (Portsmouth), July 7, 1795, at 2 (both publishing the same piece as the
Federal Orrery with different capitalization).
146. BRYAN, supra note 5, at 260 (citing IMPARTIAL OBSERVER AND WASHINGTON ADVERTISER,
June 17, 1795) ("As early as the middle of June, 1795, public worship was regularly held at the
capitol every Sunday morning. Rev. George Ralph, the rector of Christ Episcopal Church, officiated
on these occasions." (footnote omitted)).
147. Letters from Manasseh Cutler to Joseph Torrey (Jan. 4, 1802 and Jan. 3, 1803), in 2 LIFE
JOURNALS AND CORRESPONDENCE OF REV. MANASSEH CUTLER, LL.D., supra note 2, at 66, 119.
148. Calumny Refuted, THE CENTINEL OF FREEDOM (Newark, N.J.), Mar. 8, 1803, at 3 (quoting a
letter from Rev. William Parkinson to "his friend in Mifflin county [Pa.]").
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only two days after he wrote a letter to the Danbury Baptists in which he
employed the now-famous metaphor of a "wall of separation between
church and state." 49
Apparently the third President did not believe the "wall of separation" to
be a literal one, as, in addition to attending services at the Capitol, Jefferson
also allowed religious worship inside the walls of two executive buildings.
During Jefferson's administration, ministers held church services in both the
Treasury Building and the War Office.'50 Neither the legislative nor
executive branches had any objections to their buildings being put to
religious uses. And even the Supreme Court chamber in the Capitol was
used for religious services at times. 151
The services conducted in the Capitol included many aspects of what
could be considered worship, such as preaching and the singing of psalms.15 2
There is no record that the Capitol services included the sacrament of
Communion, but those at the Treasury Building and War Office did.'53
Reverend Manasseh Cutler, a Massachusetts Congressman, referred to the
services in both the Capitol and the Treasury as "worship." 54 Other
149. Id. at 66; HUTSON, supra note 5, at 93. The Supreme Court has employed this metaphor in
interpreting the Establishment Clause to require keeping a "high and impregnable" wall between
church and state. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16, 18 (1947).
150. See Diary of Manasseh Cutler (Dec. 23, 1804), in 2 LIFE JOURNALS AND CORRESPONDENCE
OF REV. MANASSEH CUTLER, LL.D., supra note 2, at 174; THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCER, AND
WASHINGTON ADVERTISER, May 15th, 1801, at 3 ("Permission having been obtained by the vestry
of Washington Parish, Divine Service will be performed every Sunday afternoon at at [sic] four
o'clock, at the new War Office, by revd. Mr. M'Cormick, commencing the ensuing Sabbath.");
Calumny Refuted, supra note 148, at 3 (quoting a letter from Rev. William Parkinson to "his friend
in Mifflin county [Pa.]") ("I preach on the LORD'S day morning in the capitol, and in the evening at
the treasury.").
151. See Diary of Manasseh Cutler (Nov. 11, 1804), in 2 LIFE JOURNALS AND CORRESPONDENCE
OF REV. MANASSEH CUTLER, LL.D., supra note 2, at 171 ("At 3, service was attended in the Court
Room, and a Mr. Spear ... preach an excellent sermon . . . .").
152. Margaret Bayard Smith, Reminiscences, in THE FIRST FORTY YEARS OF WASHINGTON
SOCIETY 1, 14 (Gallaird Hunt ed., 1906). According to Margaret Bayard Smith, a regular attendee at
Capitol services, the psalm-singing was accompanied for a time by the Marine Band, but the practice
was discontinued as a failure. Id.
153. See Diary of Manasseh Cutler (Dec. 23, 1804), in 2 LIFE JOURNALS AND CORRESPONDENCE
OF REV. MANASSEH CUTLER, LL.D., supra note 2, at 174 ("Attended worship at the Treasury....
Sacrament. Full assembly. Three tables; service very solemn; nearly four hours."); Diary of John
Quincy Adams (Jan. 29, 1804), in 27 The Diaries of John Quincy Adams: A Digital Collection 65,
http://www.masshist.org/jqadiaries/ ("Attended public service at the War Office-It was the
communion day, and the services continued nearly four hours. . . .").
154. Diary of Manasseh Cutler (Dec. 2, 1804), in 2 LIFE JOURNALS AND CORRESPONDENCE OF
REV. MANASSEH CUTLER, LL.D., supra note 2, at 172 ("Attended worship at the Capitol"); Diary of
Manasseh Cutler (Dec. 23, 1804), in 2 LIFE JOURNALS AND CORRESPONDENCE OF REV. MANASSEH
CUTLER, LL.D., supra note 2, at 174 ("Attended worship at the Treasury.").
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contemporary sources labeled the Capitol meetings "worship" as well.'
Ministers of all denominations preached in the Capitol building for the
fifty-plus years it was used, including Presbyterians, Methodists,
Episcopalians, Quakers, Baptists, Swedenborgians, Roman Catholics, and
Unitarians.' 56  Sermons in the Capitol were often evangelical in tone. The
first woman to preach there, Dorothy Ripley, exhorted her audience (which
included Thomas Jefferson and Vice President Aaron Burr) that "Christ's
Body was the Bread of Life and His Blood the drink of the righteous."157
Another preacher spoke on "perfecting holiness in the fear of the Lord," with
the intent to show "the excellence of religion and the importance of a truly
religious character."' Services in the Capitol continued until the 1850s,
and then resumed again from 1865 through 1868."9 During those years, the
House of Representatives allowed the First Congregational Church of
Washington to use its chambers until it finished its own building.'60 Once
area churches established their own buildings, the demand for government
buildings apparently died off.
IV. WORSHIP IN A LIMITED PUBLIC FORUM: BRONxHOUsEHOLD, GLOVER,
AND BADGER CATHOLIC
Although Good News Club involved activities that could easily be
described as worship, the Supreme Court declined to characterize them as
worship or at least as "mere worship."' 6 ' The Court therefore did not
address the exact question of whether something labeled as worship could be
excluded from a limited public forum. Local governments, and eventually
the Ninth Circuit, seized on this omission to disallow worship in public
155. See TRENTON FEDERALIST, June 12, 1809, at 3 ("DIED. . . At Washington, very suddenly on
the 4th inst. FRANCIS MALBONE, Esq. Senator of the U. States, from the State of Rhode-Island.
He dropped down and instantly expired on his way to attend religious worship at the Capitol.");
CARLISLE GAZETTE, July 1, 1795, at 2 ("Public Worship is now regularly administered at the Capitol
. . . ."); CONNECTICUT GAZETTE (New London), Dec. 17, 1800, at 2 (printing the reports of
Congress) ("Mr. Speaker signified the desire of Mr. Lisle, chaplain of the house, to open the
chamber of the representatives for public worship on Sundays-leave was thereupon granted.").
156. HUTSON, supra note 5, at 85. When the House elected a Unitarian chaplain in 1821, an
Episcopal minister said the members had "expelled Jesus Christ from the House," and urged a
boycott of the Capitol services. Id.
157. Id. at 86.
158. Diary of Manasseh Cutler (Feb. 27 1803), in 2 LIFE JOURNALS AND CORRESPONDENCE OF
REV. MANASSEH CUTLER, LL.D., supra note 2, at 118.
159. HUTSON, supra note 5, at 84. As Hutson notes, it was during this very period that Congress
passed the Fourteenth Amendment, which the Supreme Court later interpreted as applying the
Establishment Clause to the states. Id.; see Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947).
160. HUTsoN, supra note 5, at 84.
161. In fact, the majority pointed out that the Second Circuit in its opinion below had not
determined that the activities were worship. Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98,
112 n.4 (2001). Justice Souter, however, believed the club's activities were "an evangelical service
of worship." Id. at 138 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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buildings.
A. Bronx Household of Faith v. Board of Education of City of New York
The Bronx Household line of cases began in 1994 when Community
School District Number Ten in New York City denied Bronx Household of
Faith's request to rent space for Sunday morning meetings, which would
have involved the "singing of Christian hymns and songs, prayer, fellowship
with other church members and Biblical preaching and teaching,
communion, sharing of testimonies" and a "fellowship meal."1 62 New York
state law allowed school districts to open school facilities for "social, civic
and recreational meetings and entertainments, and other uses pertaining to
the welfare of the community; but such meetings, entertainment and uses
shall be nonexclusive and shall be open to the general public." 63  The
school district denied the request pursuant to the New York City Board of
Education's policy, which prohibited outside organizations from
"conducting religious services or religious instruction on school premises
after school."'6 In the initial suit, the district court granted the school
district's motion for summary judgment,165  and the Second Circuit
affirmed.166
162. Bronx Household of Faith v. Bd. of Educ., 492 F.3d 89, 92 (2d Cir. 2007).
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Bronx Household of Faith v. Cmty. Sch. Dist. No. 10, No. 95 Civ. 5501 (LAP), 1996 WL
700915, at *1 (Dec. 5, 1996).
166. Bronx Household of Faith v. Cmty. Sch. Dist. No. 10 (Bronx Householdl), 127 F.3d 207 (2d
Cir. 1997). The Second Circuit, through Judge Roger Miner, concluded that the policy was
viewpoint neutral and reasonable. Id. at 214. The court said,
We think that it is reasonable in this case for a state and a school district to adopt
legislation and regulations denying a church permission to use school premises for
regular religious worship. We think that it is reasonable for state legislators and school
authorities to avoid the identification of a middle school with a particular church. We
think that it is reasonable for these authorities to consider the effect upon the minds of
middle school children of designating their school as a church. And we think that it is a
proper state function to decide the extent to which church and school should be separated
in the context of the use of school premises for regular church services.
Id. The court did not explain how "religious services or religious instruction" could be singled out
and excluded, even though the schools were generally open to social, civic, and recreational
meetings. Nor did it indicate any limits on the ability of a school to pursue a strict separation of
church and state, even if not required or permitted by the Constitution. The court's decision
emphasized the way in which cases such as Bronx Household and Glover, though often decided
under Free Speech Clause analysis, are often reasoned based on Establishment Clause
considerations.
Judge Jos6 Cabranes agreed with the majority that the policy was constitutional with respect
to "religious services" but thought it was viewpoint discriminatory with respect to religious
instruction. Id. at 217 (Cabranes, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). He concluded that
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After the Supreme Court's 2001 decision in Good News Club, the
church again brought suit after being denied a permit.'6 7  This time the
district court granted a preliminary injunction against the school district.'68
A divided panel of the Second Circuit affirmed, finding "no principled basis
upon which to distinguish the activities set out by the Supreme Court in
Good News Club from the activities that the Bronx Household of Faith has
proposed for its Sunday meetings .... "69
While the preliminary injunction was in effect, the Board of Education
modified its policy to prohibit using school buildings for "holding religious
worship services, or otherwise using a school as a house of worship."170 The
district court then granted Bronx Household's motions for a permanent
injunction and summary judgment, finding the exclusion of the church group
to be viewpoint discriminatory.' 7 1 On appeal, the Board of Education
argued that the exclusion did not constitute viewpoint discrimination, and
even if it did, discrimination would be justified to avoid an Establishment
"[u]nlike religious 'instruction,' there is no real secular analogue to religious 'services,' such that a
ban on religious services might pose a substantial threat of viewpoint discrimination between
religion and secularism." Id. at 221. Judge Cabranes made two significant errors. First, he assumed
that religious services are distinct from religious instruction. In reality, however, religious
instruction is a core part of many or most religious services, and it is impossible to divorce the two.
In this respect, the majority was at least more consistent. He did admit, however, that he was more
skeptical than the majority of the government's ability to distinguish "religious worship-or indeed
religious instruction" from other forms of speech the school district had allowed. Id. at 221.
Enforcement of the policy in other cases could, he said, lead to an excessive entanglement with
religion. Id. Yet despite this problem with the policy, he was not willing to strike it down.
Second, Judge Cabranes assumed that simply because religious services are "by definition
religious in nature" and do not "serve as a vehicle for . . . secular viewpoints," they can be
permissibly excluded from a forum. Id. But, like the majority, he failed to explain how these
services are second-class speech simply because they are religious. Essentially, both Judge
Cabranes and the majority allowed a school to say, "Our facilities are open to all social, civic, and
recreational activities, as long as those activities are not religious." But the Constitution does not
allow such discrimination. See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 269 (1981); Capitol Square
Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 760 (1995) ("Our precedent establishes that
private religious speech, far from being a First Amendment orphan, is as fully protected under the
Free Speech Clause as secular private expression.").
167. Bronx Household, 492 F.3d at 93.
168. Bronx Household of Faith v. Bd. of Educ., 226 F. Supp. 2d 401 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
169. Bronx Household of Faith v. Bd. of Educ. (Bronx Household 1l), 331 F.3d 342, 354 (2d Cir.
2003). As to the Establishment Clause defense, the panel majority said, "In light of the Supreme
Court's refusal to find a valid Establishment Clause interest in Good News Club, and the strong
factual similarities between this case and Good News Club, the district court's ruling is adequately
supported at this stage of the litigation." Id at 356. This was decided by a different panel than that
in Bronx Household I, with the exception of Judge Miner, who vigorously dissented. Id. at 357
(Miner, J., dissenting).
170. Bronx Household, 492 F.3d at 94 (Calabresi, J., concurring).
171. Bronx Household of Faith v. Bd. of Educ., 400 F. Supp. 2d 581, 592, 601 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
The district court also held that the policy fostered an excessive entanglement with religion, by
requiring school officials to determine what constitutes worship. Id. at 598. The court said, "No
litmus test can be applied to determine when worship ends and when religious teaching or
instruction begins." Id.
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Clause violation.17 2  A divided panel of the Second Circuit vacated the
injunction and the grant of summary judgment.173 The panel judges wrote
three separate opinions in addition to the per curiam opinion that vacated the
district court's decision. 17 4
In his concurring opinion, Judge Guido Calabresi argued that excluding
worship was a valid content-based restriction rather than viewpoint
discrimination.175 He reasoned that worship is not simply a viewpoint, but is
a distinct category of speech that is sui generis.'76  He pointed to the
footnote in Good News Club that said the club's activities were not "mere
worship, divorced from any teaching of moral values."' 77  Judge Calabresi
avoided articulating a definition of worship and relied instead on Bronx
Household's own identification of its activities as worship.77 Because
worship is a distinct category of speech, excluding worship is content
discrimination, which is permissible as long as it is reasonable in light of the
forum's purpose.17 9 Judge Calabresi said the Second Circuit was bound by
its earlier holding in Bronx Household I that the school board's policy was
reasonable. 80  And he noted three additional grounds upon which the
172. Bronx Household, 492 F.3d at 95 (Calabresi, J., concurring).
173. Id. at 106.
174. Id. at 91 (per curiam).
175. Id. at 106 (Calabresi, J., concurring). A permissible content-based restriction would be one
that reserves a forum "for certain groups or for the discussion of certain topics," as long as the
limitation is reasonable in light of the forum's purpose. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ.
of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995). But the government engages in viewpoint discrimination when it
"denies access to a speaker solely to suppress the point of view he espouses on an otherwise
includible subject." Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 806 (1985).
176. Bronx Household, 492 F.3d at 100 (Calabresi, J., concurring). Sui generis is a Latin term
meaning "[o]f its own kind or class; unique or peculiar." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1475 (8th ed.
2004).
177. Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 112 n.4 (2001).
178. Bronx Household, 492 F.3d at 101-02 (Calabresi, J., concurring). As noted by Judge
Walker, Judge Calabresi only examined Bronx Household's as-applied challenge, and ignored the
church's facial challenge to the policy. Id. at 130 (Walker, J., dissenting). Addressing the facial
challenge would not have allowed Judge Calabresi to rely on the description the church's pastor
attached to the church's activities.
179. Id. at 104 (Calabresi, J., concurring).
180. Id at 105. Judge Calabresi quoted from the Second Circuit's decision in Good News Club v.
Milford Central School, 202 F.3d 502, 509 (2000), which in turn quoted Bronx Household I for the
proposition that "it is a proper state function to decide the extent to which church and school should
be separated in the context of the use of school premises." Judge Calabresi noted that although the
Supreme Court had reversed the Second Circuit's holding in Milford because the Court found
viewpoint discrimination, the Court had not reached whether the exclusion would be reasonable in
light of the forum's purposes. Bronx Household, 492 F.3d at 105. This is somewhat misleading,
however, because viewpoint discrimination is by definition unreasonable because it is
unconstitutional. Therefore, the Court in Good News Club at least implied that the restriction was
unreasonable.
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exclusion of Bronx Household could be reasonable.'"' First, children may
think the services were school-sponsored. 182 Second, community members
may feel "marginalized, confused, and shut out" by the use of the school for
religious purposes.18' And, third, certain denominations would be excluded
from the forum because they do not worship on Sunday.' Judge Calabresi
studiously avoided addressing how the Establishment Clause directly related
to the case, 185 but all three of his proposed justifications derive their only
possible force from the Establishment Clause.186
Judge Pierre Leval joined in vacating the injunction on procedural
grounds rather than the merits because he did not believe the case was ripe
for adjudication.'87 But Judge Leval nevertheless commented on the merits,
particularly the Supreme Court's decision in Good News Club:
The Court's insistence that Good News Club's activities did not
constitute "mere worship" seems to indicate that the Court attaches
constitutional significance to whether "worship" was involved, and
may even suggest, as Judge Calabresi notes, that the Supreme Court
will ultimately conclude that worship may be excluded, while
181. Bronx Household, 492 F.3d at 105 n.8 (Calabresi, J., concurring).
182. Id.
183. Id. He said, however, that
[w]e need not resolve here how these complaints would inform an examination of a
putative challenge, under the Establishment Clause, to the use of the school as a house of
worship. I take note of this concern only as it constitutes an additional reasonable basis
for defendants' content-based restriction of worship services given the purposes of this
limited forum.
Id Judge Calabresi thus subtly invokes the Establishment Clause without actually determining
whether the Establishment Clause can justify the exclusion of worship.
184. Id. Judge Calabresi continued,
We need not decide here whether this lack of neutrality among religions would implicate
a potential violation of the Establishment Clause that would be sufficiently overriding as
to permit discrimination on the basis of viewpoint. For the question now before us is not
viewpoint discrimination, but simply the existence of a reasonable justification for
content-based rules.
Id.
185. See supra notes 183 and 184.
186. Perceived sponsorship or support would present no legal or constitutional problem at all,
aside from its possible Establishment Clause implications. The second and third grounds could have
a small amount of force based on conceptions of fairness and a desire to avoid inequitable treatment.
But the danger of "marginalization" would require excluding many kinds of groups, both religious
and irreligious, that could not be excluded consistent with Supreme Court precedent. And it is
unreasonable to exclude church groups simply because they desire to meet on weekends, just as it
would be unreasonable to exclude a Boy Scout troop that happened to choose Saturday as its
meeting day. Notably, Judge Calabresi did not mention the potential Establishment Clause problems
with excluding worship from the forum.
187. Bronx Household, 492 F.3d at 123 (Leval, J., concurring). The school board's revised policy
had not yet been enforced against Bronx Household, which was meeting in a school building under a
preliminary injunction against enforcement of the prior policy. Id. at 107.
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associated teaching of moral values may not.188
Judge Leval also suggested that if Bronx Household were to perform
activities such as Communion only for those of a certain faith, "this might
well be deemed a violation of the Establishment Clause."1 89
Judge John M. Walker Jr. wrote a dissenting opinion, in which he
argued that the school board engaged in impermissible viewpoint
discrimination.' 90 He criticized Judge Calabresi both for his speech forum
analysis and for failing to articulate an objective definition of worship.' 9'
He said Judge Calabresi failed to define the limits of the limited public
forum, thereby allowing him to define worship outside the forum's limits.' 9 '
Judge Walker said,
Of course, because the concept of worship is so ephemeral and
inherently subjective, Judge Calabresi is able to indulge his
preference that worship be defined not by what it is, but by what it
is not. And what worship is not, in his view (and convenient for his
purposes), is anything that the Board has already permitted to occur
188. Id. at 118.
189. Id. at 121-22. This suggestion is legally dubious. A private church group would not offend
the Establishment Clause by restricting participation in communion to its members. Under Judge
Leval's proposition, it could just as easily be argued that a labor union must allow all attendees,
whether union members or not, to vote. This would clearly fly in the face of the church or union's
associational rights. See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 648 (2000) ("The forced
inclusion of an unwanted person in a group infringes the group's freedom of expressive association
if the presence of that person affects in a significant way the group's ability to advocate public or
private viewpoints."). Bronx Household's meetings were open to the general public, which is all
that the school use policy required. Bronx Household, 492 F.3d at 92 (Calabresi, J., concurring).
190. Bronx Household, 492 F.3d at 124 (Walker, J., dissenting).
191. Id.
192. Id. at 128-29. A proper analysis to reach Judge Calabresi's conclusion would have required
first articulating a legal definition of "worship." It would then require showing that the school board
created a forum that was only open to a limited range of civic purposes. If it were open to all
purposes, it would be a designated public forum, rather than a limited forum, and any restrictions on
speech would be subject to strict scrutiny. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1132
(2009). Next, the analysis would require showing that worship did not fit within the forum's limited
range of purposes. Finally, it would require showing that Bronx Household's activities fit the legal
definition of worship. Only then could the church group properly be excluded as a matter of free
speech law (though the exclusion could still violate the Establishment Clause). See Deutsch, supra
note 15, at 38-43.
Norman Deutsch points out that the scope of a limited public forum is defined by what it
includes, not be what it excludes. Id. at 38. But if Judge Calabresi had focused on the broad range
of community activities that were included within the school district's forum, he would have had a
difficult time concluding that Bronx Household's activities were not included. Thus, he improperly
defined the forum based on what was excluded-worship. With the question framed in this way, the
conclusion was inevitable that worship fell outside the forum's purposes. But it is unfair to conclude
something falls outside a forum without ever defining the forum's confines.
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in the forum. Yet the fact is that none of us, who are judges, are
competent to offer a legal definition of religious worship.' 93
Approaching the issue through the lens of the endorsement test, Judge
Walker concluded that the Establishment Clause provided no justification
for excluding the church meetings.194  Under all the circumstances, there
was no likelihood that an objective observer acquainted with the history of
the school use policy or the forum would perceive a preference for religion
over non-religion.' 95 Nor did the "vagaries of the school calendar" show a
preference for religions that worshiped on Sunday.'96  Judge Walker did,
however, warn of "entangling the judiciary in religious controversy in
violation of the First Amendment."l 97  Judge Calabresi's failure to
objectively define worship left the task to the school board, "thereby likely
ensuring that the Board's entanglement in the process will violate the
Establishment Clause." 98
On remand, the district court issued a permanent injunction against
enforcement of the revised policy.'99 This mooted Judge Leval's procedural
objection to reaching the merits. The church appealed the permanent
injunction, and the same panel of the Second Circuit heard oral arguments
on October 6, 2009.200
B. Faith Center Church Evangelistic Ministries v. Glover
In Glover, a library in Contra Costa County, California, denied Faith
Center Church access to its facilities for Saturday meetings and worship
services after the church used the library meeting room for an afternoon
"praise and worship" service.20' The meetings usually included "religious
speech and religious worship" and "discussing the Bible and other religious
books," as well as "teaching, praying, singing, sharing testimonies, sharing
193. Bronx Household, 492 F.3d at 129 (Walker, J., dissenting). Judge Walker noted, "I do not
suggest that 'worship' is not possible to define-just that it is impossible for a court to define." Id.
at 129 n.10. He left room for legislative definitions of worship. See id
194. Id at 131.
195. Id at 131-32.
196. Id at 132 (citing Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 652 (2002) (focusing on
"neutrality and the principle of private choice") and Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533
U.S. 98, 119 n.9 (2001) ("[W]e would not find an Establishment Clause violation simply because
only groups presenting a religious viewpoint have opted to take advantage of the forum at a
particular time.")).
197. Bronx Household, 492 F.3d at 131.
198. Id. at 124.
199. Bronx Household of Faith v. Bd. of Educ., No. 01CV8598 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 1, 2007).
200. Approved Calendar for the week October 5 through October 9, United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit, http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/docs/calendar/oct/oct5.pdf (last visited
Mar. 20, 2010). The court had not yet issued an opinion at the time this Comment was submitted for
publication in early 2011.
201. Faith Ctr. Church Evangelistic Ministries v. Glover, 480 F.3d 891, 904 (9th Cir. 2007).
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meals, and discussing social and political issues."202 The County's policy
said the library meeting room was open for "meetings, programs, or
activities of educational, cultural or community interest," but the policy
specifically excluded "religious services."203 The church obtained a
preliminary injunction from the district court, which found the policy to be
viewpoint discriminatory as applied to Faith Center. 20
A divided Ninth Circuit panel reversed, holding that excluding the
church group's worship service was a permissible subject matter
limitation. 205 The court, speaking through Judge Paez, concluded that parts
of Faith Center's meetings were permissible, including "discussing the Bible
and other religious books [as well as] teaching, praying, singing, sharing
testimonies, sharing meals, and discussing social and political issues."206
But it found that the afternoon "worship service" that took place during
Faith Center's first use of the building "exceeded the boundaries of the
library's limited forum." 207  To exclude the worship service was not
viewpoint discrimination, the court reasoned, because "[p]ure religious
worship ... is not a secular activity that conveys a religious viewpoint on
otherwise permissible subject matter." 208 Therefore, it "is not a viewpoint
but a category of discussion within which many different religious
perspectives abound." 209  The court cited footnote four of Good News
Club210 and concluded that this case was the kind contemplated by that
footnote, in which "pure religious worship was too tenuously associated to
the forum's purpose."211
202. Id. at 903.
203. Id. at 902-03.
204. Id. at 905.
205. Id. at 911.
206. Id. at 914 (insertion in original).
207. Id. at 915. The Court failed to address, however, that the library did not simply deny Faith
Center's application for further worship services, but also for further meetings, which were, in the
court's view, within the purposes of the forum. Nor did the majority address how the afternoon
"worship services" differed in content from the "praying" and "singing" that went on in the morning
meeting.
208. Id.
209. Id. Judge Paez still characterized worship as a "category of discussion," apparently
recognizing that worship is communicative in nature.
210. Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 112 n.4 (2001) ("In any event, we
conclude that the Club's activities do not constitute mere religious worship, divorced from any
teaching of moral values.").
211. Glover, 480 F.3d at 915 n. 14. In reaching this conclusion, Judge Paez assumed that the
Supreme Court in Good News Club "implicitly acknowledged that religious worship exceeded the
boundaries of the limited public forum." Id. at 915. In fact, it is debatable that the Court implied
that at all. The Court rejected the school district's argument that the Club's activities were "religious
worship" because the Second Circuit had made no such finding. Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 112
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The court disagreed with Faith Center's contention that distinguishing
worship from other forms of protected speech would violate the
Establishment Clause.21 2  It noted the church's reliance on the Supreme
Court's observation in Widmar that distinguishing between the practices of
various faiths would "tend inevitably to entangle the State with religion in a
manner forbidden by our cases."213 And Judge Paez admitted, "The
distinction to be drawn here is thus much more challenging-one between
religious worship and virtually all other forms of religious speech-and one
that the government and the courts are not competent to make."214 But the
court concluded that Faith Center had already made that distinction by
separating its morning meeting from its afternoon "praise and worship"
service. 2 15 The court said, "The County may not be able to identify whether
Faith Center has engaged in pure religious worship, but Faith Center can and
did."2 16 Thus, the court concluded that the library's exclusion of worship as
a distinct category of speech was permissible in order to preserve the
purpose of the limited forum.
Judge Tallman dissented from the panel decision.217 He pointed to the
excessive entanglement problems inherent in distinguishing worship from
other religious speech.218 He said, "Creative wordplay cannot avoid the
reality that worship is intangible, and even what Faith Center itself
determines is religious worship may not be worship to another."21 9 He also
argued that excluding religious worship was viewpoint discrimination, based
on the faulty assumption that "all religious services, regardless of
denomination, do not communicate ideas on topics that are permissible
n.4. Instead, the Court focused on the fact that the Club's activities, whether religious worship or
not, could not be divorced from the teaching of moral values. Id The Court emphasized that it was
the substance of the activities, not the label, that was of legal significance. Id. And the Court found
the substance-singing, praying, Bible teaching, and proselytizing-to be "indistinguishable" from
Lamb 's Chapel and Rosenberger. Id. Thus, Judge Paez relied on a debatable interpretation of a
single piece of dicta, rather than following the Supreme Court's lead and looking at how the
substance of Faith Center's activities related to the purpose of the forum.
212. Glover, 480 F.3d at 916.
213. Id at 917 (quoting Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 269 n.6 (1981)). Judge Paez
characterized this observation in Widmar as "dicta that was not central to the Court's holding." Id.
at 916. The same could be said, however, of footnote four in Good News Club, upon which the
Second and Ninth Circuits have been quick to rely.
214. Id. at 918.
215. Id.
216. Id. Judge Paez said the court "need not speculate" about the possibility, raised by the dissent,
that there would be excessive government entanglement when the library encountered a future
applicant that was less candid than Faith Center. Id. at 918 n.18. But this possibility calls the
court's rule into serious question. It is a poor constitutional rule that excludes speakers from a
speech forum simply because they identified their activities in a particular way. It would reward
duplicity and punish honesty, especially when even honest religious groups do not know what the
court considers excludable "worship."
217. Id. at 921 (Tallman, J., dissenting).
218. Id. at 921-26.
219. Id. at 924.
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under the policy, such as moral character." 220
The Ninth Circuit denied a petition for rehearing en banc, and
republished the panel decision with a minor amendment on March 9,
2007.221 Joined by six others, Judge Bybee dissented from the denial of
rehearing en banc.222 The dissenters pointed out that many religions and
Christian denominations engage in activities indistinguishable from Faith
Center's, yet they would not call their activities worship.223 Judge Bybee
said the majority had "jettisoned three decades of equal access
jurisprudence, created a constitutionally inferior category of religious
speech, and given governments throughout our circuit license to favor
certain religions over others."224
The Supreme Court denied certiorari.225 On remand, the district court
was bound by the Ninth Circuit's speech forum analysis but found that the
exclusion violated the Establishment Clause because it created an excessive
government entanglement with religion.226 The district court found that "the
record demonstrates that if there are questions about whether activities are
religious services, rather than other religious activities permitted in the
Meeting Room, someone from the County reviews the application to make
that determination." 227  Therefore, the court concluded that "the Religious
Use [restriction] fails the third prong of Lemon, which requires the Court to
examine whether the government conduct results in 'an excessive
government entanglement with religion."' 228 The court also noted that even
the Ninth Circuit panel had admitted that parsing worship and religious
speech was a distinction "that the government and the courts are not
competent to make." 229 The district court's decision was not appealed.
220. Id. at 928. He also pointed out that Faith Center, in identifying its activities as religious
worship, never claimed that its services were mere worship, devoid of any teaching on permissible
topics such as moral values. Id. at 929. Therefore, even if the Court could properly rely on the
church's self-identification, there was no basis under Supreme Court precedent to exclude it. See
Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 112 n.4 (2001).
221. Glover, 480 F.3d at 895 (order denying rehearing en banc).
222. Id. (Bybee, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
223. Id. at 901-02.
224. Id. at 902.
225. Faith Ctr. Church Evangelistic Ministries v. Glover, 552 U.S. 822, 822 (2007).
226. Faith Ctr. Church Evangelistic Ministries v. Glover, No. 04-03111, 2009 WL 1765974, at
*7-8 (N.D. Cal. June 19, 2009).
227. Id. at *9.
228. Id. at *8 (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 613 (1971)).
229. Id. at *9 (quoting Glover, 480 F.3d at 918 (opinion of Paez, J.)).
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C. Badger Catholic, Inc. v. Walsh
Badger Catholic dealt with the University of Wisconsin at Madison's
distribution of student fees to student groups. 230  In 2007, the University
denied funding to one group, Roman Catholic Foundation (which later
changed its name to Badger Catholic), because its activities included
"worship, proselytizing, or sectarian religious instruction." 23 1 The district
court concluded that the University's student fund system created a
metaphysical limited public forum, as in Rosenberger, and that the
University had engaged in unreasonable content-based discrimination by
denying the funds.232 The court rejected the University's Establishment
Clause defense, observing that "a state does not violate the Establishment
Clause by affording religion the same access to a public forum that it grants
to non-religious groups."233
The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision.234 Writing
for the panel majority, Judge Frank Easterbrook said the University's
discrimination, however labeled, was impermissible under Widmar and
Rosenberger.2 35 These cases and their progeny established that
"underwriting a religious speaker's costs, as part of a neutral program
justified by the program's secular benefits, does not violate the
Establishment Clause even if the religious speaker uses some of the money
for prayer or sectarian instruction." 236  The majority also rejected the
University's claim that it could selectively withhold funds even if the
Establishment Clause did not require it. 237 Judge Easterbrook observed that
there is little distinction between "devotional activity" and "discussion with
a religious component" and that the University would be hard pressed to
weed out the one without disallowing the other.238
230. Badger Catholic, Inc. v. Walsh, 620 F.3d 775, 776 (7th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct.
1604 (2011).
231. Roman Catholic Found., UW-Madison, Inc. v. Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys., 578 F. Supp.
2d 1121, 1127 (W.D. Wis. 2008).
232. Id.atll30,1137.
233. Id.atll31.
234. Badger Catholic, 620 F.3d at 779.
235. Id Judge Easterbrook did not decide whether the discrimination was viewpoint or content
discrimination, observing that "[t]he Supreme Court is not always clear about the difference .... "
Id
236. Id. at 778.
237. Id. at 779-82. Judge Easterbrook pointed out that even the Supreme Court's decision in
Christian Legal Society v. Martinez did not upset the precedent requiring equal access. Id. at 781.
In Martinez, the Court found that the Hastings law school could deny recognition to religious student
groups that were not open to all students, regardless of status or belief. Christian Legal Soc'y
Chapter of the Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll. of the Law v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 2981-82
(2010). Yet, as Judge Easterbrook observed, the Court in Martinez had still recognized that
"singl[ing] out religious organizations for disadvantageous treatment" is impermissible. Badger
Catholic, 620 F.3d at 781 (quoting Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2987).
238. Badger Catholic, 620 F.3d at 781.
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Judge Ann Williams dissented, arguing that excluding worship was
permissible content discrimination that did not require "a theological debate
about what worship means" because the University did not deny money to
the "Catholic version of worship," but to "any group to practice its version
of worship."239 There is no secular speech equivalent to worship, and
therefore "[t]o exclude purely religious activities is a categorical, neutral
exclusion." 240 Regarding how to determine what is "purely religious," the
University could rely on groups' self-identification.241 Thus, according to
Judge Williams, "when a group self-identifies an act and elevates it as
worship, then the University rightly respects that." 242 She conceded that the
University could have funded purely religious activities without violating
the Establishment Clause, but only if it created an unlimited public forum. 243
Having created a limited public forum, however, the University could
choose to fund certain categories of speech based on content.24
The Badger Catholic decision created a circuit split with the Ninth
Circuit on excluding religious worship from a limited public forum.
Although Glover deals with public buildings, whereas Badger Catholic
involves funding, both cases were argued and decided under the same legal
rules. The Seventh Circuit, unlike the Ninth, directly confronted the
Establishment Clause as a potential justification for a policy of exclusion.
But the unstated assumption of the Glover majority and of Judge Calabresi
in Bronx Household is that excluding worship serves the goal of avoiding a
real or perceived Establishment Clause violation. Therefore, the circuit split
presents the question: what does the Establishment Clause have to say about
permitting worship in a limited public forum?
V. WORSHIP IN PUBLIC BUILDINGS AND THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
TESTS
The constitutionality of worship in public buildings can be analyzed
under all the Court's predominant Establishment Clause tests. As mentioned
239. Id. at 785 (Williams, J., dissenting).
240. Id.
241. Id. at 787.
242. Id. Judge Williams's rather surprising conclusion that denying funding shows "respect" for
worship may be explained in part by her belief that to equate religious activities with discussion or
debate "degrades religion and the practice of religion." Id. at 785 (citing Bronx Household of Faith
v. Bd. of Educ., 492 F.3d 89, 102 (2d Cir. 2007) (Calabresi, J., concurring)). One might still
question, however, whether it really shows greater respect for religious worship to deny it funding or
access to public buildings.
243. Id. at 788.
244. Id
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in the Introduction, there are three questions to be answered. The first is
what is meant by "worship." The second is whether the Establishment
Clause can justify excluding worship from a limited public forum. The third
is whether the Establishment Clause prohibits the exclusion of worship from
public buildings.
A. What Is "Worship"?
The first step in determining whether worship can be excluded from a
limited forum is defining worship. Webster's Third New International
Dictionary defines it as "the reverence or veneration tendered a divine being
or supernatural power; also: an act, process, or instance of expressing such
veneration by performing or taking part in religious exercises or ritual."245
Another definition is "respect, admiration, or devotion for an object of
esteem." 246 This is an adequate definition for discussing worship in public
forums. 247 But it is not a sufficient definition to enable judges to determine
what is or is not religious worship. 248 As discussed below, 249 assigning to
judges such a task would conflict with the Supreme Court's precedent and
would present more difficult problems of definition.
Richard Esenberg says defining worship as one particular thing is a
"fool's errand." 250 He gives an overview of the Christian understanding of
worship and shows that religious worship nearly always communicates about
the world in a way that fits the requirements of most public forums. 25 1 This
communicative aspect of worship is significant because the Supreme Court
in Good News Club relied on the fact that the singing, praying, and Bible
teaching also communicated teaching about moral values.252 Esenberg notes
245. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2637 (2002).
246. Id.
247. There was no real dispute in either Bronx Household or Glover that the activities in question
were worship. Bronx Household of Faith v. Bd. of Educ., 492 F.3d 89, 101-02 (2d Cir. 2007)
(Calabresi, J., concurring); Faith Ctr. Church Evangelistic Ministries v. Glover, 480 F.3d 891, 918
(9th Cir. 2007). Nor is it unreasonable to conclude that at least some aspects of the singing, prayer,
and proselytizing in Good News Club were worship. Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533
U.S. 98, 112 n.4 (2001). The issues in question are whether judges can parse worship from non-
worship and whether worship can be excluded as something "other" than speech that communicates
a religious viewpoint.
248. Judge Walker correctly noted that worship is not incapable of definition, but rather it is
impossible for a court to define it. Bronx Household, 492 F.3d at 129 n.10 (Walker, J., dissenting).
Although a court can theoretically define anything it wishes, there are certain concepts that are
beyond the cognizance of the legal system. Judges are poorly equipped to define and judicially
recognize concepts such as love, beauty, or worship, because these are philosophical and theological
concepts, rather than legal ones. Even the Supreme Court has recognized that worship is a concept
that is not "within the judicial competence to administer." Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 269
n.6 (1981).
249. Infra notes 313-26.
250. Esenberg, supra note 15, at 499.
251. Id at 496-500.
252. Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 112 n.4.
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that "it is difficult to know where mere religious perspectives on secular
subjects end and worship with secular implications begins."253 It is not so
much that worship is indefinable, but that worship is almost impossible to
distinguish from religious speech, which must be permitted access to a
limited public forum.254 But for purposes of this Comment, I will define
worship as reverence or veneration directed toward an object of esteem or
divine being. With this definition in mind, the next question is whether the
Establishment Clause requires or justifies the exclusion of worship from
public buildings.
B. Do Establishment Clause Concerns Justify the Exclusion of Worship?
It could be argued that the Establishment Clause requires the exclusion
of worship from a limited public forum, but the more common view among
courts and scholars is that excluding worship is permitted, not required.255
Some scholars have suggested that excluding worship can be justified in
terms of anti-establishment concerns.256 That is, state actors might be
allowed to exclude religious worship as a prophylactic measure in order to
avoid even approaching an Establishment Clause violation.257 But
government measures to comply with the Establishment Clause cannot
infringe on individuals' freedom of speech. 25 8  Thus, excluding religious
253. Esenberg, supra note 15, at 506.
254. Id.
255. See Tebbe, supra note 15, at 1267 ("[T]he state generally ought to be allowed considerable
latitude to exclude religious activities and actors from its support, at least as a constitutional
matter."); Marker, supra note 15, at 674 ("In no way does this Note argue that a limited public forum
must restrict worship."); see also Bronx Household of Faith v. Bd. of Educ., 492 F.3d 89, 95, 105
n.8 (2d Cir. 2007) (Calabresi, J., concurring) ("[D]efendants' desire to avoid seeming to favor some
religions is a reasonable ground for limiting this forum only to speech that does not include the
category 'worship."').
256. See Tebbe, supra note 15, at 1267-68. The circuit courts have studiously avoided the
Establishment Clause issues, even though the school district in Bronx Household argued that
avoiding an Establishment Clause violation justified the exclusion. See Bronx Household, 492 F.3d
at 95, 105 n.8 (Calabresi, J., concurring); Faith Ctr. Church Evangelistic Ministries v. Glover, 480
F.3d 891, 919 n.20 (9th Cir. 2007). And the Establishment Clause is in fact the only potentially
legitimate justification for exclusion. As noted by dissenting Judge Walker in Bronx Household, the
only two explanations for the School Board's actions were "a mistaken belief that such exclusion is
necessary to comply with the Establishment Clause or due to some hostility to religious groups."
Bronx Household, 492 F.3d at 123 n.2 (Walker, J., dissenting).
257. See Tebbe, supra note 15, at 1268 ("The government may exclude religion in order to pursue
a stricter vision of antiestablishment than the First Amendment requires, at least within certain
limits.").
258. See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 267-68 (1981) ("The Constitution forbids a State to
enforce certain exclusions from a forum generally open to the public, even if it was not required to
create the forum in the first place."). In a limited public forum, as here, the speech restriction must
not discriminate on the basis of viewpoint and must be "reasonable in light of the purpose to be
1089
worship from a limited public forum lies right in the area of tension between
the Free Speech and Establishment Clauses of the First Amendment.259
The Supreme Court has indicated that compliance with the
Establishment Clause may be a sufficiently compelling interest to justify
content-based speech restrictions. 26 0  And the Ninth Circuit held that
excluding worship is a content-based distinction that is not viewpoint
discriminatory. 261 But even if this is correct, the exclusion still must be
required by the Establishment Clause in order to constitute a compelling
interest.262 Thus, it is important to determine if the presence of religious
worship in public forums offends the Establishment Clause under any of the
approaches the Court has employed.
1. The Lemon Test
Applying the Lemon test, it is difficult to argue that allowing worship in
public buildings causes any serious tension with the Establishment Clause.
A policy of equal access seems to promote the secular purpose of allowing
community groups to use public forums.263 Although it is conceivable that
in rare situations creating a designated or limited forum could have a non-
secular purpose, in the vast majority of cases an equal access policy can only
have a predominantly secular purpose.26
As to Lemon's second prong, a policy that permits worship, along with a
wide range of other activities, would only marginally advance religion.
Although the religious groups would clearly benefit from such a policy, its
served by the forum." Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 106-07 (2001) (quoting
Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc., 471 U.S. 788, 806 (1985)).
259. And the Supreme Court has always erred on the side of protecting free speech, particularly in
cases where there is a weak Establishment Clause argument. See Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches
Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 395 (1993); Widmar, 454 U.S. at 272-73; Good News Club,
533 U.S. at 113.
260. Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 761-62 (1995). The Court
in Good News Club did not decide whether an Establishment Clause violation would justify
viewpoint discrimination. Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 113. It was enough that there was no
Establishment Clause interest in denying equal access to a religious group for after-school programs.
Id.
261. Glover, 480 F.3d at 915. This conclusion is tenuous at best and may conflict with the Court's
holdings in Lamb's Chapel and Good News Club. See Deutsch, supra note 15, at 45-51.
262. See Pinette, 515 U.S. at 761-62.
263. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 839 (1995) ("We have
held that the guarantee of neutrality is respected, not offended, when the government, following
neutral criteria and evenhanded policies, extends benefits to recipients whose ideologies and
viewpoints, including religious ones, are broad and diverse.").
264. It is conceivable, for example, that officials of a small town could open up a public building
to general community uses with the actual intention of assisting a church group, knowing well that
no other community groups would step forward and avail themselves of the forum. But such a
situation is highly unlikely. Most government actors would be well aware that opening a forum for a
wide range of uses would in fact attract a wide range of users, secular and religious. It would thus be
difficult for a government actor to open up such a forum with a predominantly religious purpose.
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primary effect would not be to advance religion.265 As the Court observed in
Pinette:
We find it peculiar to say that government 'promotes' or 'favors' a
religious display by giving it the same access to a public forum that
all other displays enjoy. And as a matter of Establishment Clause
jurisprudence, we have consistently held that it is no violation for
government to enact neutral policies that happen to benefit
religion.266
Allowing religious groups to use a forum for worship on the same footing
that other groups are allowed to use it for other purposes cannot be mistaken
as anything but neutral.267
Finally, equal access would not lead to excessive entanglement.
Government officials would not be forced to "inquire into the significance of
words and practices to different religious faiths." 268  On the contrary, it
would not require any parsing of religious beliefs or involvement with
religion at all. Schools and libraries would only need to verify that religious
groups' use of the facilities fit within the broad categories of uses
"pertaining to the welfare of the community" or of "cultural or community
265. If one characterized the policy at an extremely specific level-such as "allowing churches to
worship in public buildings"-one might conclude that the policy had the primary effect of
advancing religion. But to do so would be to blatantly disregard the larger character of the forum.
266. Pinette, 515 U.S. at 763-64.
267. See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 839. It is important to remember that the Establishment Clause
only applies to state action, not to the actions of individuals. See Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388,
399 (1983) ("It is true, however, that under Minnesota's arrangement public funds become available
only as a result of numerous, private choices of individual parents of school-age children. . . .
Where, as here, aid to parochial schools is available only as a result of decisions of individual
parents no 'imprimatur of State approval,' can be deemed to have been conferred on any particular
religion generally." (citation omitted)). In Glover and Bronx Household, the only state action was
opening the public buildings for a wide range of public expression. Bronx Household of Faith v. Bd.
of Educ., 492 F.3d 89, 90-91 (2d Cir. 2007) (describing the New York City school board policy
allowing use of school facilities for "social, civic, [or] recreational meetings, . . . and other uses
pertaining to the welfare of the community" (alteration in original)); Faith Ctr. Church Evangelistic
Ministries v. Glover, 480 F.3d 891, 902 (9th Cir. 2007) (describing the policy of the Contra Costa
County library "to encourage the use of library meeting rooms for educational, cultural and
community related meetings, programs and activities"). Likewise, in Badger Catholic, the only state
action was providing funding to all student groups. Roman Catholic Found, UW-Madison, Inc. v.
Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys., 578 F. Supp. 2d 1121, 1125 (W.D. Wis. 2008) (describing the
challenged state action as the failure to sponsor worship activities from the university's fund for
student activities). The worship services involved in those cases were neither suggested nor
encouraged by state actors. Instead, they were initiated and conducted entirely by private individuals
who were using the forum pursuant to an open-access policy.
268. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 269 n.6 (1981).
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interest."269 Government actors need not entangle themselves with religious
worship any more than they do with Boy Scout or union meetings.
Furthermore, it is difficult to argue that religious worship presents any
more problems under the Lemon test than religious speech, which the
Supreme Court has consistently held must be permitted in limited public
forums.270  Religious worship, however it might be defined, is no more
religious than prayer, singing Christian songs and hymns, Bible reading and
commentary, discussion of religious views and experiences, and invitations
to trust Jesus Christ as Savior, all of which the Supreme Court has said must
be permitted in public buildings.27 1
2. The Endorsement or Reasonable Observer Test
The endorsement test provides the best rationale for excluding worship
because some might perceive an endorsement of worship if officials allow it
in a public forum.272 For purposes of this test, however, the reasonable
observer "must be deemed aware of the history and context of the
community and forum." 273  The reasonable observer in Bronx Household
and Glover would be aware of the neutral policy of equal access for both
religious and non-religious groups.274 The Supreme Court has made clear
that "any risk" of perceived endorsement should not "counsel in favor of
excluding ... religious activity."275  So, although some observer might
perceive a state endorsement of religion, a reasonable and informed observer
would recognize that the policy promotes neutrality toward religion.276
269. See Bronx Household, 492 F.3d at 92 (Calabresi, J., concurring); Faith Ctr. Evangelistic
Ministries v. Glover, 480 F.3d 891, 902 (9th Cir. 2007).
270. See Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 108-09 (2001); Lamb's Chapel v.
Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 392-93 (1993); Widmar, 454 U.S. at 277. The
Court in Widmar never specifically addressed the nature of the forum created by the university, but it
did not challenge the district court's characterization of the forum as a limited public forum. Id. at
272.
271. Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 137-38 (Souter, J., dissenting); Widmar, 454 U.S. at 265 n.2.
272. One student comment criticizing the Glover decision concedes that allowing worship in
public forums would fail the endorsement test. Tyler, supra note 15, at 1367-69. His conclusion,
however, is not based on a proper understanding of the endorsement test and the concomitant
principle of government neutrality, which is not offended by an equal access policy.
273. Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 780 (1995) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
274. Id. at 782 ("The reasonable observer would recognize the distinction between speech the
government supports and speech that it merely allows in a place that traditionally has been open to a
range of private speakers . . . .").
275. Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 119; see Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1,
35 (2004) (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("Nearly any government action could be overturned as a
violation of the Establishment Clause if a 'heckler's veto' sufficed to show that its message was one
of endorsement.").
276. Neutrality is an important aspect of the Establishment Clause inquiry. See Rosenberger v.
Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 839 (1995) ("[A] significant factor in upholding
governmental programs in the face of Establishment Clause attack is their neutrality towards
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Additionally, as observed above,277 it is unlikely that a reasonable
observer would perceive a greater endorsement of religion in "worship" than
he would in the activities involved in Widmar and Good News Club.278
From the endorsement test perspective, it is also very difficult to distinguish
between speech that involves a religious perspective on a secular topic, on
the one hand, and religious worship, on the other.27 9 A reasonable observer
would probably perceive just as much religious content in a sermon from the
Bible as he would in the singing of Christian songs or participation in
Communion. Thus, any Establishment Clause concerns under this test are
slight at best, and they are certainly no greater than those that would result
from excluding worship.280
3. The Coercion Test
The coercion test would not provide a good justification for excluding
worship because allowing worship in a public building would not coerce
anyone into religious behavior. Under the legal coercion test posited by
Scalia and Thomas, there would not even be a colorable claim of
coercion.282 And even under Justice Kennedy's more expansive
psychological coercion test, there must be sufficient "subtle coercive
religion.").
277. See supra notes 270-72 and accompanying text.
278. See Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 137-38 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("Good News's classes
open and close with prayer. In a sample lesson considered by the District Court, children are
instructed that '[t]he Bible tells us how we can have our sins forgiven by receiving the Lord Jesus
Christ. It tells us how to live to please Him.... If you have received the Lord Jesus as your Saviour
from sin, you belong to God's special group-His family."' (alterations in original)); Widmar v.
Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 265 n.2 (1981) ("A typical Cornerstone meeting included prayer, hymns,
Bible commentary, and discussion of religious view and experiences.").
279. To exclude the former would clearly constitute viewpoint discrimination. See Good News
Club, 533 U.S. at Ill ("We disagree that something that is 'quintessentially religious' or 'decidedly
religious in nature' cannot also be characterized properly as the teaching of morals and character
development from a particular viewpoint.").
280. See id. at 114 ("Because allowing the Club to speak on school grounds would ensure
neutrality, not threaten it, Milford faces an uphill battle in arguing that the Establishment Clause
compels it to exclude the Good News Club.").
281. See id. at 115 ("Here, where the school facilities are being used for a non school function and
there is no government sponsorship of the Club's activities, Lee is inapposite.").
282. See Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 49 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring
in the judgment) ("The kind of coercion implicated by the Religion Clauses is that accomplished 'by
force of law and threat of penalty.' Peer pressure, unpleasant as it may be, is not coercion."
(quoting Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 640 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting))); Lee, 505 U.S. at 642
(Scalia, J., dissenting) ("I see no warrant for expanding the concept of coercion beyond acts backed
by threat of penalty .... ). Peer pressure cannot constitute coercion under the Scalia and Thomas
test because there is no state action or legal coercion.
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283pressures" for an Establishment Clause violation.
The Supreme Court employed its most expansive view of the coercion
test in Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe, in which it held that
student-led prayer at a high school football game violated the Establishment
Clause.284 But the Court relied on the fact that the school had adopted a
policy allowing students to choose whether to have prayer at football
games.285 The Court made clear that the Establishment Clause does not
"impose a prohibition on all religious activity in our public schools."286
Allowing equal access to religious groups during non-school hours is clearly
distinguishable from allowing school-sponsored prayer during school
activities. No form of the coercion test could be stretched to say that non-
religious people or members of other religions would feel coerced into
participating in weekend worship services in schools or libraries. 287
Therefore, the coercion test does not provide a compelling justification for
excluding worship from limited public forums.
4. History and Traditions
The practice of holding religious services in federal buildings does not
go quite as far back as the practice of appointing legislative chaplains, which
began in 1789,288 but it does date back to 1795.289 This was six years after
the First Amendment was proposed and less than four years after it was
ratified. 29 0 History shows that Thomas Jefferson and members of the Fourth
Congress not only did not oppose using public buildings for Sunday
worship, but actually authorized and encouraged it. The views of the Fourth
Congress can be relied upon to reflect the original understanding of the First
283. Lee, 505 U.S. at 588.
284. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000). The Court said, "Even if we regard
every high school student's decision to attend a home football game as purely voluntary, we are
nevertheless persuaded that the delivery of a pregame prayer has the improper effect of coercing
those present to participate in an act of religious worship." Id. at 312.
285. Id. at 296-98, 310, 313.
286. Id. at 313. Furthermore, "nothing in the Constitution as interpreted by this Court prohibits
any public school student from voluntarily praying at any time before, during, or after the schoolday.
But the religious liberty protected by the Constitution is abridged when the State affirmatively
sponsors the particular religious practice of prayer." Id
287. See Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 100 (2001) ("The Court rejects
Milford's attempt to distinguish those cases by emphasizing that its policy involves elementary
school children who will perceive that the school is endorsing the Club and will feel coerced to
participate because the Club's activities take place on school grounds, even though they occur during
nonschool hours.").
288. See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 787-88 (1983).
289. See supra note 146.
290. The First Amendment was adopted by Congress on September 25, 1789 and ratified on
December 15, 1791. See Marsh, 463 U.S. at 788; Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of
Hialeah, 723 F. Supp. 1467, 1482 (S.D. Fla. 1989), rev'd on other grounds, 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
Church services began meeting in the unfinished Capitol building no later than June 1795. See FED.
ORRERY, supra note 145, at 289.
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Amendment because a number of the members were drafters of that
Amendment. Of the 148 members of the Fourth Congress in 1795, thirty
had been members of the First Congress, which drafted the Bill of Rights. 291
It should be no great surprise that a Congress willing to authorize paid
chaplains, as the First Congress was, would also allow religious services in
public buildings.292 The Establishment Clause concerns raised by opening
the Capitol or executive buildings to ecumenical church services were
certainly no greater than those raised by paying Congressional chaplains.293
Therefore, under a "history and traditions" test like that applied in Marsh,
religious worship in public buildings does not offend the Establishment
Clause. This is particularly true in cases such as Bronx Household and
Glover, where the worship is taking place as part of a policy of equal access
to a forum.294
C. Is Excluding Worship Permissible Under the Establishment Clause?
The next question is whether excluding religious worship from a public
forum violates the Establishment Clause. The District Court in Glover
concluded that it does, but the issue is not one that has been thoroughly
examined.295 Parties usually invoke the Establishment Clause against
alleged preferential treatment of religion, and they rely on it much less often
291. See Biographical Directory of the United States Congress 1774-2005, GPO ACCESS, 43-46,
51-53 (Jan 3, 2005), http://clerk.house.gov/art-history/house-history/index.html (last visited Mar.
20, 2010). Of the thirty-two members of the Senate in 1795, eleven had been in the First Congress,
nine as senators and two as representatives. Id. Nineteen of the original members remained in the
House in 1795. Id.
292. The members of the First Congress were very interested in religious observance. Directly
after President Washington's inauguration on April 30, 1789, the entirety of the House and Senate,
as well as the President and Vice President, went to St. Paul's Chapel for "divine service." 1
ANNALS OF CONG. 29 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834). Both houses had adopted a resolution that
said, "Resolved, That after the oath shall have been administered to the President, he, attended by the
Vice President and members of the Senate, and House of Representatives, proceed to St. Paul's
Chapel, to hear divine service." Id. at 25.
293. In fact, under any of the common modem Establishment Clause tests (other than the "deeply
embedded in traditions" test of Marsh), paid chaplains would be a much more serious threat of
establishment than a policy of equal or even preferential access to public buildings for religious
groups.
294. A policy of equal access does not show any preference for religious over non-religious uses
of the forum. This comports with the Supreme Court's modem approach to the Establishment
Clause. See discussion supra notes 96-139 and accompanying text. But, in fact, the modem notion
of disestablishment "neutrality" would have been foreign to the framers of the First Amendment.
See discussion supra notes 74-76.
295. Faith Ctr. Church Evangelistic Ministries v. Glover, No. 04-03111, 2009 WL 1765974, at
*8-10 (N.D. Cal. June 19, 2009). Even the district court only devoted two pages of the opinion to
the discussion.
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in cases of hostility toward religion.296 The Supreme Court has indicated
that certain Establishment Clause principles-specifically excessive
entanglement, endorsement, and neutrality-can be applied to disapproval of
religion.297 Some lower courts, such as the Ninth Circuit, have explicitly
applied the Lemon test to such cases.
1. The Lemon Test
The Supreme Court has never employed the Lemon test to strike down a
policy hostile toward religion. 9 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court indicated
as long ago as Everson that the Establishment Clause might prohibit certain
actions hostile toward religion. 2 99  The Ninth Circuit has concluded that
"[a]lthough the Lemon test is perhaps most frequently used in cases
involving government allegedly giving preference to a religion, the Lemon
test accommodates the analysis of a claim brought under a hostility to
religion theory as well."300 Other than the Ninth Circuit, the federal circuits
have infrequently applied the Lemon test to disapproval of religion.30 ' The
296. See id. at *8; see also Catholic League for Religious & Civil Rights v. City & Cnty. of S.F.,
567 F.3d 595, 599 (9th Cir. 2009) (opinion of Paez, J.), reh g en banc granted, 586 F.3d 1166 (Nov.
5, 2009) ("Although the courts have not often had occasion to determine whether government action
effects a disapproval of religion, as opposed to an endorsement, the Establishment Clause's
neutrality mandate applies here with equal force.").
Claims of hostility toward religion are usually brought under the Free Exercise Clause. See
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 532 (1993) (finding that
the "Free Exercise Clause is dispositive" in analysis of an alleged attempt to disfavor religion).
297. See Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 118 (2001); Bd. of Educ. v.
Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 248 (1990); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 269 n.6 (1981).
298. Andrew Cogar has suggested that the Supreme Court has foreclosed the use of the Lemon test
for hostility claims. Andrew R. Cogar, Comment, Government Hostility to Religion: How
Misconstruction of the Establishment Clause Stifles Religious Freedom, 105 W. VA. L. REV. 279,
307 (2002). He cites to the Supreme Court's decision in Larson v. Valente, in which the Court said,
"the Lemon v. Kurtzman 'tests' are intended to apply to laws affording a uniform benefit to all
religions, and not to provisions .. . that discriminate among religions." Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S.
228, 252 (1982) (citation omitted). But Cogar renders this quotation misleading by removing the
original emphasis. Cogar, supra, at 306. The Larson Court did not say the Lemon test was not
designed for claims of religious discrimination, but rather that it was not designed for claims of
discrimination among various religions. Id. Therefore, Larson does not foreclose the application of
the Lemon test to cases of hostility toward religion. Still, Cogar's broader conclusion that Lemon is
ill-suited for such claims is correct.
299. See Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947) ("The 'establishment of religion'
clause of the First Amendment means at least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can
set up a church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion
over another. Neither can force nor influence a person to go to or to remain away from church
against his will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. No person can be
punished for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attendance or non-
attendance." (emphasis added)). Although the Everson Court may have been relying in part on the
Free Exercise Clause for these propositions, it spoke in terms of the Establishment Clause.
300. Am. Family Ass'n, Inc. v. City & Cnty. of S.F., 277 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2002).
301. See, e.g., Stratechuck v. Bd. of Educ., 587 F.3d 597 (3d Cir. 2009); Busch v. Marple
Newtown Sch. Dist., 567 F.3d 89 (3d Cir. 2009); O'Connor v. Washburn Univ., 416 F.3d 1216 (10th
Cir. 2005); Strout v. Albanese, 178 F.3d 57 (1st Cir. 1999); Bishop v. Aronov, 926 F.2d 1066 (11th
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Ninth Circuit, however, has applied Lemon in this context a number of times
and consistently engaged in the most extensive analysiS. 302 Therefore, the
Ninth Circuit provides the best starting point in applying Lemon to hostility
claims.
In Nurre v. Whitehead, for example, a panel of the Ninth Circuit applied
the Lemon test to a high school's denial of permission to play an
instrumental version of "Ave Maria" at a high school graduation
ceremony.303 Plaintiff, one of the graduating members of the wind
ensemble, brought suit claiming that the school had violated the Free Speech
and Establishment clauses. 304 The divided Ninth Circuit panel concluded
that the school's decision was viewpoint neutral and consistent with the
purposes of the forum.o30 The court then applied the Lemon test, and found
that the school's decision had a secular purpose and did not have the primary
effect of inhibiting religion because it was "to avoid conflict with the
Establishment Clause."306 It did not lead to excessive entanglement, the
court reasoned, because the school merely conducted a one-time review of
the songs.307
The Ninth Circuit cases using Lemon in hostility claims are not
particularly helpful because none of them have found an Establishment
Clause violation.30 s It is still unclear in the Ninth Circuit what is sufficient
Cir. 1991); Roberts v. Madigan, 921 F.2d 1047 (10th Cir. 1990); Smith v. Bd. of Sch. Comm'rs of
Mobile Cnty., 827 F.2d 684 (11th Cir. 1987); Phan v. Virginia, 806 F.2d 516 (4th Cir. 1986). All of
these cases rejected the plaintiffs' claims of Establishment Clause violations.
302. See, e.g., Nurre v. Whitehead, 580 F.3d 1087, 1095 (9th Cir. 2009); Catholic League for
Religious & Civil Rights v. City & Cnty. of S.F., 567 F.3d 595, 599 (9th Cir. 2009), affd on reh'g
en banc, 624 F.3d 1043 (2010); Vasquez v. Los Angeles, 487 F.3d 1246, 1255 (9th Cir. 2007); Am.
Family Ass'n, 277 F.3d at 1121; Vernon v. City of L.A., 27 F.3d 1385, 1396 (9th Cir. 1994). In all
of these cases, the circuit panels found all the Lemon prongs satisfied.
303. Nurre, 580 F.3d at 1090. Based on the plaintiffs contention, the court assumed, without
deciding, that the graduation ceremony was a limited public forum. Id. at 1094.
304. Id. at 1091. The graduating members of the wind ensemble were allowed every year to
choose a piece to perform at graduation. Id. After they were denied permission to perform "Ave
Maria," they were forced to choose another "purely secular" song. Id.
305. Id. at 1095 n.6. In his dissent, Judge Milan Smith argued that the restriction was not
reasonable in light of the purpose of the forum, because it restricted the students' secular artistic
expression. Id. at 1100-01 (Milan Smith, J., dissenting).
306. Id. at 1096, 1097 (majority opinion). Under the effects prong, the court applied the
reasonable observer test. Id. at 1097.
307. Id. at 1097-98.
308. See id.; Catholic League for Religious & Civil Rights v. City & Cnty. of S.F., 567 F.3d 595,
599 (9th Cir. 2009, affd on reh'g en banc, 624 F.3d 1043 (2010) (finding that resolution by the city
and county's board of supervisors opposing a Vatican directive did not conflict with Lemon);
Vasquez v. Los Angeles, 487 F.3d 1246, 1255-58 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that removal of a cross
from the city's seal passed Lemon test); Am. Family Ass'n, Inc. v. City & Cnty. of S.F., 277 F.3d
1114, 1121-23 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding no Establishment Clause violation under Lemon when the
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to constitute an Establishment Clause violation based on hostility.309 These
cases also point to the difficulty of applying Establishment Clause tests in
the context of hostility toward religion. 3 '0  At least with respect to the first
two prongs of Lemon, the reasoning can quickly become circular. That is, it
can be said that excluding religion has the secular purpose of avoiding an
Establishment Clause violation and has a neutral primary effect because it
ensures compliance with the Establishment Clause.31' Applied this way, as
they were in Nurre, the first two prongs of the Lemon test become
meaningless.312
Unlike the first two Lemon prongs, the excessive entanglement prong
has at least some application when religion is excluded from a forum. In
Widmar, the Supreme Court rejected the argument in Justice White's dissent
that "religious worship" is not speech protected by the Free Speech
Clause. The Court said,
Merely to draw the distinction [between religious worship and
religious speech] would require the university-and ultimately the
city and county's board of supervisors publicly condemned an advertising campaign by Christian
groups); Vernon v. City of L.A., 27 F.3d 1385, 1396-1401 (9th Cir. 1994) (finding investigation into
police chiefs religious beliefs permissible under Lemon).
309. Thus, the district court's decision in Glover could not rely on any specific Ninth Circuit
holding, but the decision was not appealed. Faith Ctr. Church Evangelistic Ministries v. Glover, No.
04-03111, 2009 WL 1765974, at *8-10 (N.D. Cal. June 19, 2009).
310. Part of the reason for the difficulty in applying Lemon in this context is that the
Establishment Clause was not designed to take the place of the Free Speech and Free Exercise
clauses. Another reason is that courts do not always clarify which clause they are using. For
example, the Ninth Circuit first applied the Establishment Clause to disapproval of religion in
Vernon v. City of Los Angeles, concluding that "[tihe government neutrality required under the
Establishment Clause is thus violated as much by government disapproval of religion as it is by
government approval of religion." Vernon, 27 F.3d at 1396. But the court relied for its
"disapproval" language on a Supreme Court case dealing with the Free Exercise Clause. The Ninth
Circuit said, "We initially observe that although the federal Establishment Clause cases for the most
part have addressed governmental efforts to benefit religion or particular religions, it is clear that 'the
First Amendment forbids an official purpose to disapprove of a particular religion or of religion in
general."' Id. (quoting Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520,
532 (1993)). Church ofthe Lukumi, however, dealt specifically with the Free Exercise Clause. The
Supreme Court in that case went on to say,
These [Establishment Clause] cases, however, for the most part have addressed
governmental efforts to benefit religion or particular religions, and so have dealt with a
question different, at least in its formulation and emphasis, from the issue here.
Petitioners allege an attempt to disfavor their religion because of the religious ceremonies
it commands, and the Free Exercise Clause is dispositive in our analysis.
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. at 532. Thus, the line of cases following Vernon began
with a misapplication of Supreme Court precedent. The Ninth Circuit would have been more correct
to cite Widmar for the proposition that at least the third prong of Lemon could apply in hostility
claims. See infra notes 313-27 and accompanying text.
311. SeeNurre,580F.3dat 1096-97.
312. The endorsement test can be applied to religious hostility claims with much more facility.
See discussion infra notes 327-37 and accompanying text.
313. Widmar, 454 U.S. at 269 n.6.
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courts-to inquire into the significance of words and practices to
different religious faiths, and in varying circumstances by the same
faith. Such inquiries would tend inevitably to entangle the State
with religion in a manner forbidden by our cases.314
As noted above, 1 the Ninth Circuit and Judge Calabresi relied on the
church groups' self-identification of their activities as worship in an attempt
to avoid problems of excessive entanglement.316 But future courts
attempting to distinguish between worship and non-worship are unlikely to
have such candid parties.317 Courts, as well as local government officials,
will thus inevitably be placed in the position of deciding which discrete
activities of religious groups constitute worship. 8  This would require
people of different religious faiths or of no religion at all to determine
whether particular religious practices, such as singing, prayer, communion,
and liturgical readings, are "worship."31 9  Even if the courts were able to
314. Id Notably, Widmar included facts very similar to those in Bronx Household, Glover, and
Badger Catholic. The district court in Badger Catholic also noted the difficulty of drawing such
distinctions. Roman Catholic Found., UW-Madison, Inc. v. Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys., 578 F.
Supp. 2d 1121, 1132 (W.D. Wis. 2008) ("[I]t is sometimes difficult to distinguish between speech
from a religious viewpoint and worship, proselytizing or sectarian instruction. Religious speech
sometimes proselytizes, and elements of worship sometimes pervade religious discussions.").
315. See supra notes 178 and 216.
316. Bronx Household of Faith v. Bd. of Educ., 492 F.3d 89, 101-02 (2d Cir. 2007) (Calabresi, J.,
concurring); Faith Ctr. Church Evangelistic Ministries v. Glover, 480 F.3d 891, 918 (9th Cir. 2007).
317. See Glover, 480 F.3d at 924 (Tallman, J., dissenting) ("[T]his flawed analysis blithely
ignores other similarly situated religious groups that may not make such a nice admission to the
County in their applications to use the room."). In her dissent in Badger Catholic, Judge Williams
went even further than the Ninth Circuit majority and suggested that it would be fine if religious
groups were disingenuous. Badger Catholic, Inc. v. Walsh, 620 F.3d 775, 787 (7th Cir. 2010)
(Williams, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1604 (2011). She approvingly noted that "[t]he
University even acknowledges that Badger Catholic could describe Catholic Mass as 'Catholic
perspectives on the world,' and that would probably be funded because the University does not test
or push the group when it self-defines an activity." Id. However, it is a poor legal rule that gives an
incentive to lie. Furthermore, if government officials did decide to challenge a group's self-
identification (hardly an unlikely circumstance), a court would be forced to determine whether or not
the activity was properly excluded from the forum.
318. Even the court in Glover based its ruling on the assumption that the church groups correctly
defined their own activities. It is unlikely, for example, that the lower courts would have found the
showing of Christian films about parenting impermissible (a result that would be directly contrary to
Lamb's Chapel), even if the group had labeled the activity "worship."
319. As noted by Judge Bybee, different religious groups would be treated differently under any
definition of worship. Glover, 480 F.3d at 901 (Bybee, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en
banc). Under the majority's test, he said,
Evangelical and Unitarian groups should generally be granted access: Moral teaching is
integral to their services, as are fellowship, singing, and other distinctly non-worship
activities. Liturgically oriented denominations such as Episcopalians and Catholics will
find themselves subject to greater burdens: The worship elements of their services are
more distinct and easily severable from the non-worship elements, and they have more
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create a legal definition of worship, there would still be potential for
administrative entanglement. 320  The line between religious speech and
worship, however defined, is very thin.
Even more thin is the line between religious speech and "mere religious
worship, divorced from any teaching of moral values." 3 21 Although Judge
Calabresi in Bronx Household relied heavily on the fourth footnote in Good
News Club, which said that the club's activities did not constitute "mere
religious worship," he never addressed the second phrase, "divorced from
any teaching of moral values."322 Judge Paez did address this second
element and concluded that the Court in Good News Club meant that
worship per se exceeded the boundaries of the forum, not that worship can
ever be fully divorced from moral instruction. 323  Even accepting Judge
Paez's formulation of this distinction-the line between "pure worship" and
the "forum's purpose"-it is very difficult to make. 324 Determining whether
worship has too tenuous a connection to "educational, cultural, or
community interest" would require not only a clear definition of worship but
also a very detailed scrutiny of those practices labeled as worship. 325
services (such as the Daily Office in the Catholic tradition) that can be characterized in
their entirety as "mere worship."
Id Adding in faiths other than Christianity simply compounds the problem. As Judge Easterbrook
observed in Badger Catholic, "Quakers view communal silence as religious devotion, and a
discussion leading to consensus as a religious exercise. Adherents to Islam and Buddhism deny that
there is any divide between religion and daily life; they see elements of worship in everything a
person does." Badger Catholic, 620 F.3d at 781.
320. The D.C. Circuit found that making a distinction between Pope John Paul II delivering a
sermon and presiding over Mass would be an impermissible entanglement. See O'Hair v. Andrus,
613 F.2d 931, 936 (D.C. Cir. 1979). The court said that making such a distinction was "an
impossible task in an age where many and various beliefs meet the constitutional definition of
religion." Id. (citing LAWRENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14-6 (1978)).
321. Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 113 n.4 (2001).
322. Bronx Household of Faith v. Bd. of Educ., 492 F.3d 89, 100-06 (2d Cir. 2007) (Calabresi, J.,
concurring).
323. Glover, 480 F.3d at 915 n.14 ("It is difficult to imagine moreover that religious worship
could ever truly be divorced from moral instruction or character development. That is not what the
majority in Good News Club meant when it wrote: 'we conclude that the Club's activities do not
constitute mere religious worship, divorced from any teaching of moral values.' That statement
must be taken in its proper context. The defendant district opened the forum in part for the moral
and character development of children. As here, pure religious worship was too tenuously
associated to the forum's purpose." (citation omitted)).
324. Judge Paez did not attempt to draw the distinction himself. He said, "Although religious
worship is an important institution in any community, we disagree that anything remotely
community-related must therefore be granted access to the Antioch Library meeting room." Id. at
915.
325. Glover, 480 F.3d at 895. In his concurrence in Good News Club, Justice Scalia pointed out
that the Court has "drawn a different distinction-between religious speech generally and speech
about religion-but only with regard to restrictions the State must place on its own speech, where
pervasive state monitoring is unproblematic." Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 126 n.3 (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (citing Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 225 (1963)). In Schenpp, the Court drew a
distinction between Bible reading at the beginning of the school day and "study of the Bible or of
religion, when presented objectively as part of a secular program of education." Schempp, 374 U.S.
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Moreover, this scrutiny into "the significance of words and practices to
different religious faiths" is what the Supreme Court has firmly rejected.326
Thus, the district courts in Glover and Bronx Household were correct, as a
matter of Supreme Court precedent, that excluding worship from a public
forum violates the excessive entanglement prong of Lemon.
2. The Endorsement Test and the Principle of Neutrality
The Supreme Court has also suggested that the endorsement test can cut
both ways. In Good News Club, the Court said, "[W]e cannot say the danger
that children would misperceive the endorsement of religion is any greater
than the danger that they would perceive a hostility toward the religious
viewpoint if the Club were excluded from the public forum."32 7  The
converse of endorsement is disapproval or hostility, which is contrary to the
well-recognized First Amendment principle of government neutrality toward
religion.3 28 As the Supreme Court has observed, "[I]f a State refused to let
religious groups use facilities open to others, then it would demonstrate not
neutrality but hostility toward religion."3 29 Even if courts were somehow
able to draw a legitimate legal distinction between worship and other forms
of religious speech, there is no reasoned way to exclude worship without
leaving room for discrimination against religion.330
It could be argued that the reasonable observer would see a difference
between religious worship and religious speech and would thus find no
hostility toward religion if the government disallowed worship in a limited
at 225. But as Justice Scalia noted, this is very different than monitoring private religious speech.
Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 127 (Scalia, J., concurring).
326. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 269 n.6 (1981). As the Court observed in Rosenberger, a
policy requiring public officials to scrutinize publications "to discern their underlying philosophic
assumptions respecting religious theory and belief' would "risk fostering a pervasive bias or
hostility to religion, which could undermine the very neutrality the Establishment Clause requires."
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 845-46 (1995).
327. Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 118.
328. See Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 248 (1990) ("[T]he message is one of neutrality
rather than endorsement .....
329. Id.
330. See id. Nelson Tebbe recognizes that "[a] basic constitutional principle prevents official
action that raises an unmistakable inference of distaste for religion, unconnected to any legitimate
justification for excising religious groups or entities from funding programs." Tebbe, supra note 15,
at 1329. Tebbe attempts to deal with this problem by drawing the definition of animus toward
religion very narrowly to include only cases "where there is a glaring mismatch between the nature
of the exclusion and the nature of the program." Id. at 1331. Simply redrawing the definition of
animus, however, is small comfort for those whose expressive rights are limited. Even Tebbe admits
that "excluding religious expression is particularly difficult when the government is otherwise
promoting a range of private speech." Id. at 1318.
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public forum.33  However, the reasonable observer would have to be
particularly well-informed to know how to define worship as distinct from
religious speech, considering that neither the Ninth Circuit nor Judge
Calabresi provided a definition.3 32 Furthermore, a reasonable observer
would likely wonder how the government could justify excluding the
worship activities of religious groups when it allows non-religious groups to
conduct their activities unhindered. A policy of equal access on the other
hand, sends a message of "approval of the principle of freedom of
demonstration, for all groups, for all religions, even for those opposing
religion." 333
Even if the endorsement test does not require a strict policy of equal
access to limited public forums, it at least leaves the question in equipoise.334
The test provides at least equally good reasoning for equal access as for
exclusion. 3 In such a situation, the question ought to be decided in favor of
religious liberty and freedom of speech.336  No matter what distinctions
courts try to draw between worship and other forms of speech, worship is
still speech protected by the First Amendment.337 Furthermore, the Supreme
Court has recognized that the Constitution requires accommodation of
religion, not merely a position of strict separation or neutrality.338
Accommodation is served by an even-handed policy of equal access. 33 9
331. See Tebbe, supra note 15, at 1310 ("Worship might be viewed by citizens as dissimilar to
other expression . . . .").
332. Richard Esenberg points out that while worship might be "higher octane religion," a
reasonable observer is presumed to know that religious perspectives on secular topics are permitted
in public forums. Esenberg, supra note 15, at 512-13. Thus, a reasonable observer would likely
conclude that worship was akin to the prayer, singing, and calls to religious commitment present in
Widmar and Good News Club and was therefore permissible.
333. O'Hair v. Andrus, 613 F.2d 931, 936 (D.C. Cir. 1979). The D.C. Circuit also observed that
"[a] central aspect of our pluralist society is its religious diversity. This pluralism reflects the very
purpose of the Establishment Clause. And this pluralism is nurtured by the precept of equal access
to a public facility generally open to the public." Id. at 934-35.
334. See Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 118 (2001).
335. See id.
336. See id. at 119 ("We decline to employ Establishment Clause jurisprudence using a modified
heckler's veto. . . . There are countervailing constitutional concerns related to rights of other
individuals in the community. In this case, those countervailing concerns are the free speech rights
of the Club and its members.").
337. See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 269 (1981) ("[R]eligious worship and discussion ...
are forms of speech and association protected by the First Amendment."). Even the Ninth Circuit
recognized this fact in Glover. See Faith Ctr. Church Evangelistic Ministries v. Glover, 480 F.3d
891, 906 (9th Cir. 2007) ("We conclude that Faith Center engaged in protected speech when its
participants met in Antioch Library for prayer, praise, and worship.").
338. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 673 (1984) ("Nor does the Constitution require
complete separation of church and state; it affirmatively mandates accommodation, not merely
tolerance, of all religions, and forbids hostility toward any."). America's early history supports this
principle of accommodation, as detailed supra in notes 145-40.
339. As the Court observed in Rosenberger, "We have held that the guarantee of neutrality is
respected, not offended, when the government, following neutral criteria and evenhanded policies,
extends benefits to recipients whose ideologies and viewpoints, including religious ones, are broad
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Thus, the considerations raised by the endorsement test weigh against
excluding religious worship from public forums.
3. The Coercion Test
The coercion test is largely irrelevant to excluding religious worship
from a limited forum. Under Justice Kennedy's version of the test, there is
perhaps a colorable argument to be made that prohibiting or discouraging
worship has "subtle coercive pressures" on those who wish to participate in
religious worship. 340 For example, in the context of school prayer it could
be argued that students, as a result of school action, may feel psychological
pressure not to pray silently or individually. So the coercion test might be
applied to more general claims of government hostility to religion. 341 But in
the context of prohibiting worship in a forum, there is no legally tenable way
to determine who bears the effect of these pressures, and the psychological
coercion test is inapplicable. The converse of Thomas and Scalia's legal
coercion test is not an Establishment Clause test at all, but the Free Exercise
Clause.342 Therefore, under a strict legal coercion test, excluding religion
would be analyzed under the Free Speech and Free Exercise clauses.343
4. A Textual or Historical Approach to the Establishment Clause
As a textual and historical matter, the Establishment Clause does not
apply to the situations in Bronx Household, Faith Center, and Badger
Catholic. As written, the First Amendment only prevents Congress from
and diverse." Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 839 (1995).
340. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 588 (1992). The context, however, is quite different
from that considered by Justice Kennedy in Weisman.
341. This is not, of course, to say that it would be advisable. The psychological coercion test has
little or no foundation in the text of the Constitution, and it therefore should not be expanded and
applied to other contexts.
342. See Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 223 (1963) ("[A] violation of the Free Exercise
Clause is predicated on coercion .... ). Somewhat ironically, however, Justice Scalia authored the
Court's opinion in Smith, which made the Free Exercise Clause inapplicable to neutral laws of
general applicability that only incidentally burden religious exercise. See Employment Div., Dep't
of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879-82 (1990), superceded by statute, Religious
Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488, as recognized in Gonzales v.
O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 (2006). Thus, it is unclear what
forms of coercion "by force of law and threat of penalty," Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. at 640 (Scalia,
J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted), Justice Scalia would consider to run afoul of the Free Exercise
Clause.
343. See Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 121 (2001) (Scalia, J., concurring)
("What is at play here is not coercion, but the compulsion of ideas-and the private right to exert
and receive that compulsion (or to have one's children receive it) is protected by the Free Speech
and Free Exercise Clauses, not banned by the Establishment Clause." (citations omitted)).
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creating or interfering with religious establishments. 34 In fact, contrary to
how the Supreme Court applies it today, the First Amendment was designed
to protect state establishments. 345  Thus, the First Amendment could only
have applied to the narrow question of whether Congress could allow
religious services in federal buildings.3 46 And even this is speculative at best
because the framers likely did not have use of public buildings in mind when
writing the Establishment Clause. They would not have imagined that
Congress would exercise its enumerated powers to legislate with respect to
religious services in federal buildings. Therefore, just as the
Establishment Clause does not justify excluding worship from public
buildings, it probably does not grant a right to use a public forum for
religious worship.348
344. The Supreme Court incorporated the Establishment Clause against the states in Everson v.
Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947), even though the First Amendment itself uses the word
"Congress." U.S. CONST. amend I. Various scholars have pointed out that incorporation of the
Establishment Clause is a logical impossibility because its very purpose was to protect state
establishments. See Porth & George, supra note 86, at 138-39; Vincent Phillip Muiloz, The
Original Meaning of the Establishment Clause and the Impossibility ofIts Incorporation, 8 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 585, 631 (2006) ("Because the original meaning only recognizes a jurisdictional boundary
that protects state authority, it cannot logically be incorporated to apply against state governments.");
GERARD V. BRADLEY, CHURCH-STATE RELATIONSHIPS IN AMERICA 95 (1987) (observing that
incorporating the Establishment Clause "would be like trying to apply the Tenth Amendment to the
states").
345. See Robert P. George, Protecting Religious Liberty in the Next Millennium: Should We
Amend the Religion Clauses of the Constitution?, 32 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 27, 42 (1998) ("Far from
prohibiting the establishment of religions by the individual states, the 'Establishment Clause'
protected [state] establishments. More precisely, the Clause protected the authority of the states to
establish religions against federal efforts to disestablish state churches, or to set up a competing
national establishment."). Professor George explains that this is why the amendment uses the words
"respecting an establishment of religion" rather than simply "establishing a religion." Id. at 42-43.
The Amendment not only prohibited a federal establishment, but also prohibited Congress from
interfering with the existing establishments in the states. Id.
346. The original understanding was certainly that the government could allow religious services.
See supra notes 145-60 and accompanying text.
347. By its wording, the First Amendment does not apply to actions of the executive branch, such
as Jefferson's administration opening the Treasury or War Office buildings to public worship. See
U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof. . . ."). Congress does have the power to "exercise exclusive
Legislation" over the district designated as the seat of government, U.S. CONsT. art. 1, § 8, cl. 17, so
Congress could theoretically exercise that power in a way that violated the Establishment Clause.
But it is improbable, based on the larger purpose of the First Amendment, that those who wrote and
ratified it thought it had any application to the use of federal buildings for worship services.
348. This is not because the framers of the First Amendment were unconcerned about religion, but
because they saw the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses as serving a very limited purpose-
protecting the states from incursions by the federal government. As James Madison explained to the
House of Representatives when first introducing a proposed bill of rights, "It will be a desirable
thing to extinguish from the bosom of every member of the community, any apprehensions that there
are those among his countrymen who wish to deprive them of the liberty for which they valiantly
fought and honorably bled." I ANNALS OF CONG. 449 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834).
Furthermore, the Establishment Clause was never intended to operate on its own, but rather
in conjunction with the Free Exercise Clause (and to a much lesser extent, the Free Speech Clause).
See Everson, 330 U.S. at 15 (speaking of the "interrelation of these complementary clauses"). In
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But it is abundantly clear from history that the First Amendment's
framers saw no Establishment Clause problem with the presence of worship
in public buildings.349 It is equally clear that they considered religion
something that could (and should) be promoted.3s0  Therefore, under a
textual or originalist approach, failure to give religious worship equal access
to public buildings is perhaps not unconstitutional per se, but it is certainly
inconsistent with the views of those in the founding period. The United
States was founded upon principles of religious liberty and freedom from
government censorship, but the Ninth Circuit has come dangerously close to
trampling on those principles.35 1
D. What Are the Implications ifState Actors Are Allowed to Exclude
Worship?
Allowing local governments to exclude worship from public buildings
will have important consequences. First, it will have a serious impact on
churches and religious groups. These groups will either have to give up
using public buildings altogether or only use them for their less worshipful
activities. In order to avoid violating bans on religious worship, they will
either have to be disingenuous in labeling their activities or be extremely
careful to avoid conducting activities such as prayer, singing, and preaching
in ways that seem "worshipful."352 Furthermore, church groups will be
prevented from presenting a religious perspective on topics that fall within
the purpose of a limited public forum.353 Such viewpoint discrimination is
recent years, the Supreme Court has said that the Establishment and Free Exercises Clauses "are
frequently in tension." Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 718 (2004) (citing Norwood v. Harrison, 413
U.S. 455, 469 (1973)). At the same time, the Court has said there is "room for play in the joints"
between them, meaning that some state actions are permitted by the Establishment Clause but not
required by the Free Exercise Clause. Id. at 718-19.
This tension is a result of the Court's modem doctrinal tests and was neither intended nor
anticipated by the First Amendment's framers. See McConnell, Accommodation, supra note 52, at
6. The framers did not consider the concepts of free exercise and non-establishment (at the federal
level) to be in conflict; rather, they were both necessary for the preservation of religious liberty. Id.
The importance of the Free Exercise Clause to this discussion is that it provides further evidence that
the First Amendment's framers were concerned about promoting and protecting religious practices.
349. See supra text accompanying notes 145-60.
350. See STORY, supra note 75, at 728-31; see also supra text accompanying notes 145-60.
351. See Faith Ctr. Church Evangelistic Ministries v. Glover, 480 F.3d 891, 932 (9th Cir. 2007)
(Tallman, J., dissenting) ("Just as the government's endorsement of one particular religion would run
counter to the principles upon which this nation was founded, a County librarian's attempt to define
what constitutes religious worship and what does not also violates these principles. Squelching a
viewpoint based solely on the non-obtrusive manner in which it is spoken impermissibly silences
speech and exhibits a prejudice against religion that the First Amendment does not tolerate.").
352. See id at 924 (Tallman, J., dissenting).
353. See Deutsch, supra note 15, at 56. ("Faith Center sought to bring a religious perspective to
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precisely the evil that the Court attempted to prevent in Lamb 's Chapel and
Good News Club.354
Second, allowing the exclusion of worship will lead to a more confused
and confusing jurisprudence. Judges and local administrators will be forced
to parse seemingly indistinguishable religious practices in order to determine
what constitutes worship.35 ' Apart from the religious entanglement
problems detailed above, this lack of clarity will lead to increased
litigation."' Churches will be forced to resort to the courts to vindicate
aspects of their free speech rights that will likely be violated by overzealous
local governments. And local governments will be in the difficult position
of trying to establish clear standards to exclude "worship" without excluding
constitutionally protected speech.357 In fact, there is no way to draw
constitutionally tenable distinctions between worship and permissible
religious speech.
Third, the Ninth Circuit's holding will allow state actors to discriminate
against religious groups in general or specific religious groups in
particular. 35 There is no principled way to establish and maintain a policy
otherwise permissible subjects even if it did involve religious worship. The County excluded it from
doing so because of disagreement with, and hostility towards, religious worship in the forum. The
County also impermissibly took it upon itself to decide what religious speech is deserving of
expression.").
354. Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 111-12 (2001) ("[W]e reaffirm our
holdings in Lamb's Chapel and Rosenberger that speech discussing otherwise permissible subjects
cannot be excluded from a limited public forum on the ground that the subject is discussed from a
religious viewpoint.").
355. See Bronx Household of Faith v. Bd. of Educ., 492 F.3d 89, 129-31 (2d Cir. 2007) (Walker,
J., dissenting).
356. One student comment has proposed a "test" to determine the constitutionality of restrictions
on religious use of a limited public forum. Marker, supra note 15, at 692. This test would involve
reviewing a local official's decision of whether an activity was or was not worship by an abuse of
discretion standard. Id. at 692-93. According to Marker, "[a]n abuse of discretion standard will
encourage discussion and negotiation between the parties. This will limit the entanglement between
the courts and religious groups, as the courts will only have to intervene in the extreme cases." Id. at
693. But, in fact, such a "test" would have exactly the opposite effect. An abuse of discretion
standard, by definition, requires judicial review. If local officials had no clear definition of worship,
every determination would have to be litigated to make sure that the officials did not engage in
viewpoint discrimination or exclude permissible speech. A policy of equal access, by contrast,
would free both local officials and the courts from making difficult determinations about what
constitutes worship.
357. Even Nelson Tebbe, who attempts to create a framework that would justify excluding
worship, recognizes that "the prospect of excluding religious expression is particularly difficult
when the government is otherwise promoting a range of private speech." Tebbe, supra note 15, at
1318. In fact, Tebbe admits that to remove evenhanded state support from worship "necessarily
constitutes viewpoint discrimination." Id. at 1311. His solution to this problem is to posit that
"excluding worship performs a unique social function, protecting antiestablishment values in an
inimitable way." Id at 1312. But the Supreme Court has rejected the argument that the
Establishment Clause justifies viewpoint discrimination in cases of worship. Good News Club, 533
U.S. at 114-19.
358. The practices of varying faiths may seem more or less worshipful, depending on one's
perspective. See Faith Ctr. Church Evangelistic Ministries v. Glover, 480 F.3d 891, 901 (9th Cir.
2007) (Bybee, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
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of unequal access for worship that does not also discriminate against
religious groups and practices. 59  The issue of excluding religion or
religious worship raises an important question: why try to exclude religion at
all? The Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected the idea that the
Establishment Clause requires or even justifies this exclusion.360 And the
Court has indicated that protecting religious speech is a core concern of the
Free Speech Clause.36 ' Because there is no constitutionally sound
justification for excluding worship, it will likely be motivated either by a
poor understanding of the Establishment Clause or animus toward
religion.362 To vest in low-level government actors the discretion to exclude
worship is inconsistent with the First Amendment and poses the danger of
subjecting religious exercise to impermissible censorship.3 63
VI. CONCLUSION
When Thomas Jefferson began attending Christian services in the
United States Capitol in January 1802, he could hardly have imagined that
two hundred years later courts would struggle to determine if worship must
be, or at least may be, prohibited in public buildings. The jurisprudential
debate is certainly surprising in light of the Supreme Court's strong
precedent supporting equal access to limited public forums. But more than
just surprising, the Ninth Circuit's conclusion is harmful. If state actors are
allowed to exclude religious groups from public buildings because they
engage in "worship," churches will either have to conceal the actual nature
359. See Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 248 (1990).
360. See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 270-71 (1981); Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches
Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 394-95 (1993); Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 112, 119.
361. Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 760 (1995). The Pinette
Court said:
Our precedent establishes that private religious speech, far from being a First
Amendment orphan, is as fully protected under the Free Speech Clause as secular private
expression. Indeed, in Anglo-American history, at least, government suppression of
speech has so commonly been directed precisely at religious speech that a free-speech
clause without religion would be Hamlet without the prince. Accordingly, we have not
excluded from free-speech protections religious proselytizing or even acts of worship.
Id. (citations omitted) (citing Heffron v. Int'l Soc'y For Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640,
647 (1981) (proselytizing) and Widmar, 454 U.S. at 269 n.6 (worship)).
362. See Bronx Household of Faith v. Bd. of Educ., 492 F.3d 89, 123 n.2 (2d Cir. 2007) (Walker,
J., dissenting).
363. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 845-46 (1995) ("The
viewpoint discrimination inherent in the University's regulation required public officials to scan and
interpret student publications to discern their underlying philosophic assumptions respecting
religious theory and belief. That course of action was a denial of the right of free speech and would
risk fostering a pervasive bias or hostility to religion, which could undermine the very neutrality the
Establishment Clause requires.").
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of their activities or be driven out of public gathering places. Courts will be
required to define and identify worship-a task that is beyond judicial
competence and will impermissibly entangle the courts with religion.
Govemment actors will be allowed to discriminate against religious groups
in ways inconsistent with the First Amendment and the historical practice of
our nation. Because the Ninth Circuit has reached a constitutionally dubious
conclusion leading to a split with the Seventh Circuit, this question will
require resolution by the Supreme Court. The resolution ought to be one
that promotes equality between religious and non-religious groups. Only
equal access will promote the core purposes of the First Amendment-
freedom of speech and religious liberty.
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